IDH East Africa Living Income (EALI)

ENDLINE ASSESSMENT | FINAL REPORT

PRESENTED BY

MarketShare Associates

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IDH East Africa Living Income (EALI) - ENDLINE ASSESSMENT

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1. Executive Summary

This endline evaluation assesses the extent to which the IDH EALI program contributed to improving farmer incomes and advancing awareness and commitment toward the Living Income concept across Uganda and Kenya. Farm-level data was collected in Uganda only, to evaluate IDH's field-level interventions through partners Ibero Uganda, Agri Evolve, and Café Africa. Sector convening work on Living Income through the Uganda Coffee Platform (UCP) and Kenya Coffee Platform (KCP) was measured through key informant interviews and focus group discussions.

Findings are structured around the OECD-DAC criteria and compare evidence of IDH's outcomes and impact against its Theory of Change, including changes in income levels and stability, stakeholder influence on intended and emergent changes, inclusion outcomes for women and youth, EU compliance readiness, and the role of partnerships in driving or constraining change.

Annual net endline household income was widely distributed across the 1,157 surveyed farmers, with a median of UGX 4.36 million and mean was UGX 9.03 million; 13.1% meeting the Anker Living Income benchmark and 7.3% the higher Fairtrade threshold. Change over baseline is best measured from the 403 matched panel households[1] tracked across both rounds, where mean annual net income rose from UGX 4.51 million at baseline to UGX 10.58 million at endline, a 134% gain driven predominantly by coffee revenue. A modeled counterfactual built from national price and yield trends estimates approximately 44% of the panel income gain is associated with program effects above market trends, while the remaining 56% is influenced by national movements every Uganda coffee farmer experienced. Coffee revenue grew from yield, not price, and the effects of diversification and costs were marginal as well.

At the sectoral level, the program advanced EUDR readiness across both countries by convening competing sector actors around shared compliance infrastructure and Living Income has been established as a recognized reference point in sector discourse. Evidence for redistribution of value and risk in the sector at-large remains limited. The integration of Living Income into the Uganda Coffee Platform's EUDR Taskforce marks a meaningful sector-level outcome, signaling that income objectives are being absorbed into the coordination mechanisms driving compliance.

Structural constraints persist. The median household would need to roughly triple its income to reach the Anker benchmark and quintuple it to reach Fairtrade. Farm size alone explains 61% of income variation. Qualitative evidence indicates that gains have not translated into stable or predictable incomes. In terms of inclusivity, women's median income was 55% of men's despite comparable program exposure, indicating gender barriers in control over income.

Key Recommendations

Section 5.7 provides recommendations for IDH and its partners moving forward. Four strategic directions stand out: (1) segment productivity strategies by farm size, pairing yield interventions with diversification and cost-efficiency for farms at or below one hectare; (2) make the quality-to-price pathway work through transparent pricing, timely payments, consistent offtake, and bundled quality premiums, since this is the assumption on which the program's core income logic depends; (3) shift gender programming from access and voice to demonstrated agency, increasing women's control over income; and (4) embed Living Income measurement in the compliance systems being built, for ongoing income monitoring.

[1] Panel income change estimates apply to 403 matched households (34.8% of the 1,157 endline sample). Of the 754 unmatched endline respondents, the majority were new entrants sampled to ensure partner-level representation.

2. Introduction and Project Background

This section introduces the institutional context and provides an overview of the **East Africa Living Income Program (EALI)**, including its objectives, design, and implementation approach. It also situates the evaluation within the broader program and sector context.

2.1. Introduction

Stichting IDH (hereafter referred to as IDH) is an international organization that works to accelerate and scale sustainable trade by convening coalitions of private sector actors, governments, civil society, and knowledge institutions. Through its commodity programs, IDH aims to address systemic constraints within global value chains and promote inclusive, market-based solutions that improve producer livelihoods while ensuring environmental sustainability.

IDH commissioned this endline evaluation of the East Africa Living Income Program (EALI), implemented in Uganda and Kenya, to assess the extent to which the program has contributed to improving farmer incomes and advancing the Living Income agenda within the coffee sector.

This end-line evaluation applies a mixed-methods approach to assess progress against the program's Theory of Change, Key Performance Indicators, and OECD-DAC evaluation criteria. It is designed to support learning and decision-making to inform future programming among IDH, implementing partners, donors, and sector stakeholders.

2.2. Project Background

The East Africa Living Income Program (EALI) is part of IDH's Global Coffee Program (2021-2025), which places Living Income at the center of efforts to transform coffee value chains. The program builds on IDH's Living Income Roadmap, a framework designed to guide coordinated action by supply chain actors to close Living Income gaps among smallholder farmers.

Implemented between 2022 and 2025 in Uganda and Kenya, the EALI Program targets approximately 29,500 coffee-producing households, with the overarching objective of increasing both income levels and income stability. This dual focus reflects the recognition that improving farmer livelihoods requires not only higher productivity and earnings, but also greater resilience to price volatility, climate shocks, and seasonal income fluctuations.

2.2.1. Program Design and Strategic Approach

The program adopts a market systems development (MSD) approach to address both farm-level constraints and broader structural barriers within the coffee value chain:

- **Field-level interventions (Uganda)** focus on strengthening service delivery and improving farmer performance across five income drivers (yield, price, cost of production, land size, and diversification) through agronomic training, input and financial access, regenerative practices, and youth-led service provision models. Implementation is led by two private sector actors (Ibero Uganda, Agri Evolve) and one NGO (Café Africa Uganda).
- **Sector-level convening (Uganda and Kenya):** Through support to the Uganda Coffee Platform (UCP) and Kenya Coffee Platform (KCP), the program facilitates multi-stakeholder

dialogue, promotes alignment around Living Income, and supports sector readiness for regulatory frameworks such as EUDR and CSDDD.

Although implemented in both Uganda and Kenya, the program's field-level interventions are primarily focused in Uganda, while Kenya and Uganda are both relevant for the convening and broader system engagement components.

2.2.2. Theory of Change and Key Pathways

The program's Theory of Change (Figure 1) is based on the premise that closing the living income gaps requires coordinated changes across multiple income drivers and system-level changes.

At the farm level, the program assumes that:

- Training, service delivery, and access to inputs lead to **behavioral changes** (e.g., improved farm management practices),
- Which contribute to **productivity gains and cost efficiency**,
- Ultimately resulting in **increased and more stable incomes**.

At the system level, the program seeks to: (i) influence **business practices and value distribution** within the supply chain; (ii) strengthen **market linkages and service ecosystems**, and (iii) foster **collective action and alignment** through sector platforms.

The program targets five income drivers: yield, price, cost of production, land size, and income diversification, based on the premise that closing living income gaps requires simultaneous progress across multiple dimensions rather than gains in any single income driver.

Importantly, the program incorporates a strong gender and youth inclusion lens, with specific attention to expanding women's and young people's economic empowerment through inclusive service provision models and creating opportunities along the value chain.

Figure 1. IDH East Africa Coffee Living Income Theory of Change



Source: IDH EALI Theory of Change Document

3. Research Methods

This section outlines the methodological approach used to assess the performance and contribution of the EALI Program. It describes the evaluation framework, data collection methods, sampling strategy, and analytical approach applied in this study.

3.1. Evaluation Approach

This endline assessment applied a **mixed-methods evaluation approach** to assess the performance and contribution of the EALI Program. The design combines quantitative and qualitative methods to capture both measurable changes in outcomes and the underlying mechanisms through which these changes occurred. Quantitative methods were used to assess changes in income levels, income drivers, and key outcomes across farmer segments and levels of program exposure. Qualitative methods were used to explain how and why these changes occurred, test underlying assumptions in the Theory of Change, and identify enabling and constraining factors affecting program performance.

The evaluation drew on both **primary and secondary data sources**, enabling systematic triangulation of evidence. Quantitative findings were interpreted alongside qualitative insights from Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs), as well as program documentation and monitoring data, to assess the plausibility of program contribution.

Figure 2. Picture from MSA primary data collection in Uganda

Focus Group Discussion with Smallholder coffee farmers, in Central Region, Uganda.

Photo Credit: Dorothy Nabatanzi (MSA field researcher)

3.2. Evaluation Criteria and Questions

The evaluation was guided by the OECD-DAC criteria (relevance, coherence, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, and sustainability), which provided a structured framework to assess both the performance of the program and its contribution to broader system-level changes within the coffee sector. In addition, the evaluation applied a cross-cutting inclusion lens, examining differential outcomes for women and youth, as well as variations across farmer segments. The evaluation questions aligned with these criteria are summarized in Table 1 below.

Table 1. Evaluation Questions

EOCD-DAC Criteria	Evaluation Question (EQ)
Impact	**I1.** Is the Theory of Change validated by observed results?
	I2. To what extent has awareness of Living Income and EU regulations influenced stakeholder behavior?
	I3. What are the most significant changes in income levels and stability for different farmer segments (e.g. by gender, age, region), and what are the most effective and relevant strategies to close living income gaps for each of these segments?
Effectiveness	**ES1.** How effectively were intervention strategies tailored to baseline-identified farm segments and achieved intended outcomes?
	ES2. To what extent did the Program address gender inequalities and youth inclusion?
	ES3. To what extent did activities strengthen capacities for EU regulation compliance (EUDR/CSDDD)?
Relevance	**R1.** How relevant has the Program been to the Kenyan and Ugandan coffee sectors, and what unique value or complementarity has it provided relative to other national or donor initiatives?
	R2. To what extent does the program strategy/ TOC explicitly address living income, and what design gaps exist in achieving this objective?
Efficiency	**EC1.** How efficiently were resources used and what is the potential for scaling?
Sustainability	**S1.** To what extent are partners likely to sustain or expand outcomes?
Coherence	**C1.** To what extent are IDH interventions coherent internally and externally (avoiding duplication, promoting synergy)?
Strategic Learning	**SL1.** How have program stakeholders and external stakeholders reinforced or negatively impacted the intended changes (e.g. income increase, awareness and commitment to the living income concept) and emergent changes?

3.3. Analytical Framework and Methods

To operationalize the Theory of Change and assess program contribution, the evaluation combined multiple analytical approaches:

- **Outcome Harvesting:** Used to identify and validate key outcomes (behavioral and systemic changes), focusing on what changed, for whom, and why. Outcomes were initially identified through document review and refined through primary data collection.
- **Contribution Analysis:** Used to assess the plausibility of causal linkages between program interventions and observed outcomes. This includes systematically testing alternative explanations such as market dynamics, climate variability, and external interventions.

- **Quasi-experimental comparisons:** Outcomes are compared across program exposure levels and characteristics (partner, region, farm size, gender, baseline income) using regression analysis, Shapley decomposition, and a national-trend counterfactual. Findings are reported as patterns consistent with program contribution, not causal estimates.
- **Policy influence assessment:** A structured rubric is applied to assess changes in the enabling environment, including awareness, alignment, commitment, and action related to Living Income and regulatory frameworks (e.g., EUDR, CSDDD).

These complementary approaches enable a robust assessment of both **what changed** and **how and why change occurred**, while accounting for contextual factors and uncertainties.

3.4. Data Collection Methods

The evaluation relied on three primary data collection tools:

- **Quantitative farmer survey**: A structured survey was administered to smallholder coffee farmers to assess income levels, income drivers, adoption of practices, and exposure to program interventions. The survey is aligned with IDH Living Income measurement tools and the five income drivers framework.
- **Key Informant Interviews (KIIs)**: Semi-structured interviews were conducted with a range of stakeholders, including implementing partners, private sector actors, government representatives, and sector platform stakeholders. KIIs explored program relevance, effectiveness, system-level changes, and enabling environment dynamics.
- **Focus Group Discussions (FGDs)**: FGDs were conducted with different farmer groups (including women, youth, mixed groups, and service providers) to explore behavioral change, inclusion dynamics, and perceptions of income changes, stability, and program relevance.

The primary data collection process happened January 26 to February 21, 2026. All respondents provided informed consent prior to participation, including explicit consent for the use of images where applicable. The evaluation was conducted in full accordance with MSA's **ethical research protocols**, ensuring compliance with established standards on confidentiality, data protection, and responsible engagement with all stakeholders.

More detailed information on the data collection tools and their analytical coverage is provided in the scheme presented in Annex 1.

In addition, the evaluation drew on secondary data sources, including program documents, monitoring data, and baseline results, to contextualize findings and support triangulation. The list of analyzed documents can be found in Annex 5.

3.5. Sampling and Sample Characteristics

This section outlines the sampling strategy and presents the characteristics of the final sample for both quantitative and qualitative components of the evaluation.

Quantitative Component

For the quantitative component, a structured survey was administered to smallholder coffee farmers in Uganda. The sampling approach combined a partial panel design (revisiting baseline

respondents where possible) with additional sampling to ensure adequate representation across implementing partners and key farmer segments, including women and youth.

The endline analysis sample comprises 1,157 respondents across the three implementing partners in Uganda: IBERO (n=397), Agri-Evolve (n=392), and Cafe Africa (n=358). Of these, 403 (34.8%) have a verified baseline record and form the matched panel used for baseline-to-endline comparisons. The remaining 754 are endline-only respondents and are included in all endline cross-sectional analyses. Smaller figures that appear in specific analyses reflect non-response on particular survey questions The full panel dataset (baseline plus endline records) contains 2,115 observations. The sample design was aligned with population sizes and baseline coverage, while ensuring statistical robustness (95% confidence level, 5% margin of error) and enabling disaggregation by gender, age, and other relevant characteristics.



To strengthen inclusion analysis, the sample incorporated targeted quotas for women and youth, with additional respondents selected to ensure sufficient representation of these groups. As a result, the endline sample reflects a combination of baseline respondents and newly sampled farmers, allowing for both comparison over time and cross-sectional analysis of program exposure.

Qualitative Component

Qualitative data collection covered a diverse range of system actors across both field-level interventions (Uganda) and sector-level convening (Uganda and Kenya), enabling analysis of both implementation dynamics and broader system change.

In Uganda, qualitative fieldwork included 13 FGDs and 22 KIIs conducted across the **Rwenzori Arabica** and **Central Uganda Robusta** regions. FGDs were structured to capture perspectives from different farmer segments, including women, youth, mixed groups, service providers, cooperative representatives, and VSLA members. KIIs focused on implementing partners and value chain actors, including agronomists, buyers, and service providers.

For the convening component, KIIs were conducted with sector stakeholders in both Uganda and Kenya, including representatives from coffee platforms, private sector actors, and government institutions. While the evaluation initially targeted 15 stakeholders per country, the final sample included 5 interviews in Kenya and 9 in Uganda, reflecting limitations in extending the sample beyond primary contacts through snowball sampling. This more limited sample, particularly in Kenya, should be consider when interpreting findings related to convening dynamics and platform-level influence, as it may constrain the breadth of perspectives captured beyond core stakeholders.

Overall, the qualitative sample provides strong coverage of program implementers, beneficiaries, and key sector actors, allowing for in-depth analysis of behavioral change, system dynamics, and

enabling environmental conditions. Further details on the sample, including demographic breakdowns, are provided in Annex 2.

Key Sampling Considerations

The sampling approach was designed to balance analytical rigor, feasibility, and inclusiveness, while enabling disaggregated insights across key farmer and stakeholder groups. The quantitative component follows a partial panel design –combining baseline respondents with new participants due to attrition– while the qualitative component prioritizes depth and diversity of perspectives rather than statistical representativeness.

For the convening component, limited reach through snowball sampling constrained the diversity of perspectives captured beyond primary stakeholders, particularly in Kenya. As a result, findings related to platform influence and some broader system dynamics should be interpreted with caution, as they may reflect the views of more directly engaged actors rather than the full ecosystem.

These considerations are reflected in the interpretation of findings and in assessing the strength and scope of conclusions. Further details on limitations and the mitigation strategies adopted are provided in Annex 4.

3.6. Data Analysis

Qualitative data from KIIs and FGDs were coded and analyzed thematically using NVivo. A codebook was developed to identify key themes, causal mechanisms, and patterns across respondent groups. Direct quotations were used to support findings and provide contextual depth. Quantitative analysis combined descriptive, inferential, and panel-based methods across the full endline cross-section (n=1,157) and a matched panel subset (n=403). Results were stratified by region, coffee type, gender, and farmer segment. Findings were systematically triangulated across data sources (survey, KIIs, FGDs, and program documents) to assess convergence, explain divergence, and strengthen confidence in conclusions. This integrated approach supports assessment of program contribution while accounting for alternative explanations.

Figure 3. Picture from MSA primary data collection in Uganda

A coffee cooperative leader is showing their production in Mityana District.

Photo Credit: Dorothy Nabatanzi (MSA field researcher)

Figure 4. Picture from MSA primary data collection in Uganda

Input dealer working in Central Region, Uganda.

Photo Credit: Isaac Mwaka (MSA field researcher)

4. Overall Findings

The evaluation questions are answered in Section 5. Answering those questions rigorously first requires establishing what happened to household incomes, which factors drove those changes, and how much of the improvement reflects program interventions rather than the favorable market conditions all Ugandan coffee farmers experienced between 2023 and 2025. Section 4 presents that analytical foundation, so that Section 5 can work from shared evidence rather than embedding explanations that would interrupt its evaluative logic.

Households more than doubled their incomes over the program period, from UGX 4.5 million to UGX 10.6 million. That headline figure needs context. Of the 6.1 million UGX increase, approximately 44% is reasonably attributable to program effects above the market trend; the rest reflects national price and yield gains from favorable weather and market conditions that benefited coffee farmers regardless of program participation. Even so, the median household still earns less than one-fifth of the Fairtrade living income benchmark. The counterfactual analysis shows that the program's impact worked primarily through production volume rather than price capture, and that farm size remains the main factor in whether a household closes the living income gap.

This section proceeds through five analytical lenses drawing on the matched panel (n=403), the endline cross-section (n=1,157), and qualitative interviews with farmers, private sector actors, and partners. Where the three sources agree, the findings carry greater confidence. Where they diverge, we explain the tension and note what each source contributes.

4.1. Living Income

Household incomes of coffee farmers at endline show a wide distribution. For the 1,157 farmers surveyed at endline, median household income was 4,363,199 UGX per year, while the mean

was 9,027,919 UGX per year, more than double the median. That gap reflects a long right tail of higher-earning households that pulls the average well above what a typical farming family earns.[2]

Figure 5. Endline Household Income Distribution (n = 1,157; middle 95% shown)



Living income benchmarks capture the full cost of a decent standard of living for a household. Two benchmarks apply in Uganda: the Anker benchmark (UGX 15.1 million) and the higher Fairtrade threshold (UGX 23.6 million for Robusta, UGX 24.7 million for Arabica). The Fairtrade threshold is higher because it uses a larger reference household (about 7 members, 3.4 adult equivalent) than the Anker benchmark (5 members, 2.4 adult equivalent). In the endline survey, 13.1% of farming households meet the Anker benchmark and 7.3% meet the Fairtrade threshold. Despite a 134%, income gain the median household would need to roughly than triple its current income to reach Anker and quintuple it to reach Fairtrade. The distance reflects structural constraints in land size and resource base, which the following sections examine.

Detailed information on the living income calculation can be found in Annex 4.

Figure 6. Total household Income, Baseline to Endline (Panel only)

Of the 1,157 endline households surveyed, 403 were also surveyed at baseline in 2023 and form the matched panel used to measure income change over the program period. Across the 403 matched panel households, total income more than doubled between baseline and endline, increasing from UGX 4.51 million to UGX 10.58 million (+134%). Coffee revenue was the

[2] Means are used where comparability matters, for panel change analysis and segment comparisons. Medians are used to describe the typical household, where the skewed distribution makes the mean misleading.

dominant driver of this change, growing 184% to UGX 9.6 million, though production costs increased alongside it (+98%). A private sector stakeholder in Uganda observed:

"When farmers adopt the recommended practices, you see the difference in production and that directly affects their income."

Diversified income grew a more modest 31%, but the composition of income shifted sharply: other crops net income increased 48%, business net income more than doubled (+104%), and non-farm and wage income declined 21%. This pattern suggests that some households reallocated labor toward higher-return agricultural and enterprise activities.

Interviews describe diversification as an income stabilizer as much as a contributor to income growth. Stakeholders noted that farmers commonly intercrop coffee with beans, and farmers framed diversification in terms of resilience. A farmer from Central Uganda stated:

"We now have more ways to earn, not just coffee, and that helps us manage difficult periods."

Annual loan costs increased modestly from UGX 120,000 to UGX 187,000 (+56%), consistent with expanded access through the EALI program.

Table 2. Income Composition Shift Across Matched Panel Households (n=403)

Income Comparison - Panel Only	Baseline Mean	Endline Mean	Abs. Change	% Change
A. Coffee Net Income	2,661,019	8,177,099	+5,516,080	+207.3%
A1. Annual Coffee Revenue	3,386,512	9,612,634	+6,226,122	+183.9%
A2. Total Coffee Costs	725,493	1,435,535	+710,042	+97.9%
B. Diversified Income	1,973,009	2,590,243	+617,234	+31.3%
B1. Other Crops Net Income	640,562	950,329	+309,767	+48.4%
B2. Livestock Net Income	382,008	536,836	+154,828	+40.5%
B3. Business Net Income	282,878	576,377	+293,499	+103.8%
B4. Other Non-Farm & Wage Income	667,560	526,700	–140,860	–21.1%
C. Annual Loan Cost (deducted)	119,979	187,395	+67,416	+56.2%
Total Household Income (= A + B – C)	**4,514,049**	**10,579,947**	**+6,065,898**	**+134.4%**

While income levels have improved, qualitative evidence consistently indicates that these gains have not translated into stable or predictable incomes. The quantitative analysis captures changes between two points in time and therefore does not measure intra-year variability or income volatility. Qualitative findings fill this gap, describing income patterns that remain irregular and highly dependent on seasonal, market and production factors.

"Income has improved, but it is still not stable. Some seasons are good, others are very difficult." - Male smallholder farmer, Central Region

"Coffee income comes once or twice in a year, so farmers still face challenges managing income between seasons." – Male private sector stakeholder

Household income by Partner

Endline household income varies widely across implementing partners. IBERO households reported the highest median income at UGX 6.6 million, followed by Cafe Africa at UGX 4.7 million and Agri-Evolve at UGX 2.8 million. Mean incomes run well above medians across all three partners, reflecting a smaller number of higher-earning households that pull the average above what a typical household earns. This ranking is consistent with partner-reported income data and KII observations across the three implementation models.

Table 3. Endline Household Income by Implementing Partner (endline, n=1,157)

Partner	Farm Households	Mean (UGX)	Median (UGX
Agri-Evolve	392	4,750,523	2,827,500
Cafe Africa	358	9,279,944	4,651,560
IBERO	397	12,868,131	6,612,500

Among the 403 matched panel households, all three partners saw income more than double, with growth rates between 128% and 140%. Agri-Evolve grew from a mean of UGX 1.6 million to UGX 3.7 million (+140%), Cafe Africa from UGX 4.6 million to UGX 10.5 million (+128%), and IBERO from UGX 7.9 million to UGX 18.8 million (+137%). The similar growth rates across different partner models suggest the program's income effect operates through mechanisms common to all three approaches. Differences in absolute gains (UGX 2.2 million for Agri-Evolve versus UGX 10.9 million for IBERO) reflect the roughly fivefold gap in baseline income. That gap in turn reflects partner-specific farmer selection: IBERO works with established Robusta farmers, while Agri-Evolve works with smaller Arabica holdings in the remote Rwenzori belt.

Table 4. Panel Income Change by Implementing Partner (matched panel, n = 403)

Partner	Farm Households	Baseline Mean (UGX)	Endline Mean (UGX)	Absolute Change	% Change
Agri-Evolve	101	1,558,192	3,744,035	+2,185,843	+140%
Cafe Africa	215	4,616,952	10,545,288	+5,928,336	+128%
IBERO	86	7,918,986	18,803,048	+10,884,062	+137%

Qualitative interviews reveal a split in how farmers describe income gains. Farmers more linked to structured sourcing and direct buyer relationships more often attribute improvements to better pricing and market access:

"When we improved the quality, the buyer started paying us better. Before, we were just selling, but now we know what the market wants." - Male farmer, Central Region (platform-supported value chain)

Farmers who emphasize production improvements, with no corresponding change in buyer relationships, describe more limited income uplifts:

"We learned how to take care of the coffee better, and production increased, but the price is still the same, so income has not changed much." - Female farmer, Rwenzori Region

This contrast points to a core mechanism of the project: where productivity improvements are paired with structured market access and buyer relationships, the pathway from better practices to higher income is more direct. Where the focus is primarily on production, income gains depend more on whether local market conditions allow farmers to capture the value of improved output. Evaluation Question I3. examines this pathway in more detail.

4.2. Key Performance Indicators[3]

Indicator / Metric	Female	Male	Total
KPI 1. Average coffee yield kg/ha disaggregated in male and female HH heads/farmers			
Mean yield (kg/ha)	**1,124**	**1,209**	**1,175**
n (endline sample)	462	695	1,157
KPI 2. Adoption rate disaggregated in male and female farmers			
Adoption rate	**99.8%**	**99.4%**	**99.6%**
n (endline sample)	462	695	1,157
KPI 3. HH Income increase in percent since baseline disaggregated in male and female farmers			
% Change	**+111.7%**	**+145.7%**	**+134.4%**
n (matched panel)	132	271	403
KPI 4. Number of HHs that increased their income since baseline disaggregated in male and female farmers			
HHs with income increase |	**6,692**	**12,368**	**19,057**
N (estimated population)	10,407	18,911	29,318
% with income increase	64.3%	65.4%	65.0%

4.3. Income Drivers

IDH has identified five drivers that shape coffee household income: farm size, yield, price, production costs, and non-coffee diversification. We analyze these drivers through three lenses. The first lens asks what explains variation in income levels across the endline population. The

[3] KPI 1 (average coffee yield) and KPI 2 (adoption rate) use the endline sample (n = 1,157 households surveyed in 2025). KPI 3 (household income change) uses the matched panel (n = 403 households surveyed at both baseline and endline). KPI 4 (households with income increase) projects the matched panel finding to the estimated target population (N = 29,318 households reached by EALI partners, based on program participant records).

second asks what explains variation in income change among matched panel farmers. The third asks which constraints farmers themselves identify as most binding.

What explains income differences. A Shapley R^2 decomposition of endline income levels (R^2=0.408)[4] finds that farm size accounts for 61% of explained variation, followed by yield at 29%. Price, cost, and diversification collectively explain less than 10%. Land size is the single strongest predictor of whether a household falls above or below the living income benchmark.

What explains income change. A second decomposition[5] asks which driver changes correlate with income changes among panel farmers. No single driver dominates. Diversification leads at 28%, followed by cost (23%), yield (20%), price (17%), and farm size (13%). The five drivers jointly explain a modest share of household-level income variation (cross-validated R^2 = 0.185), meaning most of the variation in how much any individual household's income changed remains unexplained by these five drivers alone.

Figure 7. Income Drivers: Three Perspectives



However, what the decomposition does show is that among the variation the five drivers do explain, contributions are broadly distributed rather than concentrated in one lever.

What farmers identify as binding constraints. Farmer own views on what most limits their income shifts this picture yet again: 39% of farmers cited yield as the primary constraint, followed by production costs (24%) and price (21%), while only 10% cited farm size. Farmers focus on what they can change. A smallholder with one hectare often cannot realistically expand their land. Low yields or high input costs, by contrast, are often problems they can act on, so they are constraints they name.

Several patterns emerge from this decomposition analysis:

1. Farm size explains income differences, but it did not drive income changes. Land accounts for 61% of variation across households yet only 13% of variation in income change over the program period, and farmers rarely perceive it as binding (10%). Land expansion requires capital most smallholders do not have, so land is often a given rather than a lever.
2. Yield shows up across all three lenses: 29% of variation in income levels, 20% of variation in income change, and 39% of farmer-reported constraints (the top-cited). This is the lever

[4] Linear OLS regression of total household income on the five drivers, with Shapley values partitioning the model's explained variance (R^2 = 0.408) across predictors (sum to 100%). Farm size, yield, and cost log-transformed; all features standardized. Sample: endline cross-section with complete data (n = 1,061 of 1,157).

[5] SHAP decomposition of percent income change from baseline to endline (winsorized at ±500%), applied to a regularized XGBoost regression. The sample is matched panel with complete driver data at both waves (n = 353 of 403). Train/test split 75/25; train R^2 = 0.558, test R^2 = 0.210, 5-fold CV R^2 = 0.185. Reported shares are mean absolute SHAP values on the held-out test set, normalized to 100%. Used for decomposition, not prediction.

EALI acts on most directly. Yet yield alone will not close the living income gap. Yield per hectare more than doubled over the program period, and the median household would still need to roughly triple its income to reach the Anker benchmark.

3. Cost and price are uneven drivers. Cost contributes meaningfully to income change (23%) and farmer perception (24%) but barely registers in income level variation (2%). Price sits in the middle: 7% of variation in income levels, 17% of income change, 21% of farmer mentions. Under the EALI Program, cost and price were addressed only through traders: on the price side, quality premiums translated higher coffee grades into stronger per-kilogram returns; on the cost side, traders consolidated input procurement so farmers could access supplies through bulk-purchase channels.
4. Diversification accounts for only 1% of income level variation but 28% of variation in income change, the largest contributor in the change model. Only 6% of farmers cite it as a binding constraint. This gap suggests farmers associate diversification with coping (wage labor, petty trade) rather than with the productive diversification (livestock, other crops, small businesses) that the panel data indicates drove gains.

Analysis of Income Drivers

The EALI program's impact on living income occurred through yield and value-addition. Yields of EALI-supported farmers more than doubled, driven by GAP practices including cover trees, rejuvenation, selective harvest, and improved seedlings. Prices did not change meaningfully for most farmers, but for a subset, increased post-harvest processing allowed them to reach higher-value steps where prices were several times the wet-cherry rate. Coffee revenue grew 184% while costs grew only 98%, so coffee net income more than tripled (+207%). Land expansion (24% of farmers) and diversification (+31%) both occurred but did not move incomes meaningfully for the overall population. At endline, 13.1% of households cleared the Anker living income benchmark and 7.3% cleared the LI Robusta benchmark.

- **Yield** 65% of endline farmers reported higher coffee harvests in 2025 than in 2023; 21% reported lower. Farmers attributed the change to management practices (49%), weather (34%), input use (34%), and tree renovation (28%). Panel data corroborates farmer's reporting: among 382 matched households, yield per hectare rose from 506 to 1,186 kg per hectare, more than doubling. At endline, the median farmer produces 865 kg per hectare, with half the sample falling between 494 and 1,359. Robusta growers outperform arabica growers on yield per hectare (929 vs 717). Four practices stand out as the strongest signals of higher measured yields: cover trees, tree rejuvenation, selective harvest, and improved seedlings[6]. Adopters of these practices have meaningfully higher yields than non-adopters, even after accounting for the other practices they're also adopting. Three of them (rejuvenation, improved seedlings, and pest and disease management) also appear significant in farmer-reported yield gains, so perception

[6] OLS regression of log(yield/ha) on 17 GAP practice adoption indicators, endline cross-section, n=940, R^2=0.087. Coefficients reported as percentage effects, computed as exp(β)−1. Practices significant at p<0.10: cover trees (+34.8%, p=0.001); rejuvenation (+27.6%, p<0.001); selective harvest (+25.5%, p=0.001); improved seedlings (+18.1%, p=0.018); pest and disease management (+14.1%, p=0.071); organic fertilizer (+13.1%, p=0.074).

matches measurement. The 34% who cited weather points to the main caveat: part of the yield gain reflects favorable conditions on top of practice adoption.

- **Price and Market Access.** Three-quarters of farmers (73.5%) sold through market channels linked to EALI implementing partners. These farmers were more likely to report price improvements since 2023 (48% vs 32%) and better buyer relationships (64% vs 44%). In terms of farm-gate prices, the farmer's partner channel, coop membership, and premium receipt showed no significant difference. The processing step they sold at, however, made the real difference. Coffee prices quadruple moving up the value-addition ladder: wet cherries fetch 3,000 UGX/kg, naturally dried cherries 7,000, dried parchment 12,000, and polished green beans 12,500. When processing step is held constant, partner and non-partner farmers at the same step receive similar prices. This indicates that partners are creating value-addition opportunities: 57% of partner-linked robusta farmers sold at dried parchment or polished green beans, versus 28% of non-partner robusta farmers. Overall, 58.5% of farmers reported better buyer relationships since 2023, and one-third received a quality or certification premium, though at endline this did not correspond to a higher measured price once processing step was accounted for.
- **Land.** The typical farmer has around 3 acres (2 to 5 acres for most of the sample), with two dedicated to coffee and one to another crop. 24% of endline farmers expanded their coffee area since 2023, by a median of +1 acre on a 2-acre base. Program finance supported only 15 of these expansions (~2% of endline sample), so expansion happened almost entirely outside of the program. Expansion did contribute to total harvest, but lower per-hectare yield gains. This likely reflects newly planted coffee not yet at full bearing. With fallow minimal and only <10% of farmers citing land as a constraint, the program's yield contribution tended to come from intensification rather than extensification.
- **Production Costs.** Coffee production cost rose from a mean of 725K to 1.44M UGX per household per year for the matched panel farms. Yields, however, rose faster, so the median cost per kilogram at endline was 1,060 UGX, roughly 12-15% of what farmers receive per kilogram. This is cash cost only and excludes family labor. Inputs (47% of total) and cash labor (41%) account for most costs, but 42% of farmers report zero cash labor and 36% report zero cash inputs, concentrated among arabica and small-plot farmers. Robusta farmers tend to run larger and more cash-intensive operations, spending a median of 971K UGX per year on coffee versus 155K for arabica. Few farmers pay for services (input application 8.5%, extension 1.2%, farm technology 0%), which points to a thin commercial services market. Farmers continue to source inputs primarily through independent agro-dealers (55%) rather than through their buyers (26%).
- **Diversified Income.** The typical coffee producing household has two to three income sources, but coffee accounts for 90% of household income for the typical household. When households do diversify, it is primarily into other crops (54%), livestock (38%), and occasionally business (21%). Diversified income grew 31.3% from baseline to endline, but coffee income grew even faster (+207%), so coffee's share of household income rose rather than fell. We found about 16% of households could legitimately be considered diversified in a productive way, whereas another 17% diversified as a likely coping strategy. The remaining two-thirds are coffee-focused: 39% are successfully specialized

in coffee, while 28% are coffee-dependent and earning very little. Diversification, as currently observed, is not functioning as a scalable pathway to a Living Income.

4.3 Counterfactual Analysis

Household income among 402 matched panel households grew from 4.5M to 10.6M UGX between baseline and endline, a 134% increase. That figure overstates the program's contribution. National robusta prices rose roughly 70% over the same period, and national-level coffee yields rose roughly 40%, so every coffee farmer in Uganda benefited from these market trends and climatic conditions. The counterfactual analysis separates these contextual effects from program-associated ones to produce a plausible modeled estimate of attribution.

That estimate is bounded by design. It covers the quantitative panel of traditional farmers in Uganda, whose production and price data can be benchmarked against UCDA national series. Specifically, the counterfactual applies the national FAQ Robusta endline price (12,906 UGX/kg) and the national yield growth rate (+40% for traditional robusta) to each household's baseline production. It does not extend to the program's other components or the regional convening activities based in Kenya, which operate through different causal pathways.

Within those bounds, the method is defensible. Price and yield are the two channels through which external conditions (weather, global markets, national policy) flow into farmer income, and the counterfactual adjusts for both by benchmarking against UCDA's national series. Diversified income (including subsidies), land area, and production costs did not shift materially within the panel between baseline and endline, and there is no evidence they would have shifted absent the program. Holding them constant in the counterfactual is therefore a reflection of what the data shows. A matched control or comparison design would strengthen the estimate, but in its absence, this approach is a reasonable and transparent approximation.

Figure 8. Uganda Coffee: Market Price and Yield Changes - 2023 to 2025



The counterfactual caps projected prices at the UCDA national endline benchmark (12,906 UGX/kg) rather than projecting from each farmer's baseline price, holds production costs at baseline levels (treating the observed cost doubling as a program-driven input investment), and

deducts the mean subsidy value (81,388 UGX/household) from the CF total. These choices are conservative and they avoid over-projecting market gains from outlier baseline prices while ensuring program-encouraged spending is not misattributed to market conditions.

Table 5. Components Summary (UGX)

Income components (mean UGX), n=403 matched panel households. Counterfactual to Endline gap shows the difference between what the market would have delivered and what farmers actually earned.[7]

Component	Baseline	Counterfactual	Actual Endline	Counterfactual → Endline Gap	% of Gap
Total HH Income (= A + B – C)	**4,514,049**	**7,823,854**	**10,579,947**	**+2,756,093**	**100%**
A. Coffee Net Income (A1 – A2)	**2,661,019**	**6,418,728**	**8,177,099**	**+1,758,371**	**+64%**
A1. Annual Coffee Revenue	3,569,644	7,144,221	9,850,034	+2,705,813	+98%
↳ Implied price (UGX/kg)	9,028	12,906	9,041	-3,865	
↳ Yield (kg/ha)	506	708	1,186	+478	
↳ Land (ha)	0.78	0.78	0.92	+0.14	
A2. Total Coffee Costs	725,493	725,493	1,435,535	+710,042	+26%
B. Diversified Income	**1,973,009**	**1,973,009**	**2,590,243**	**+617,234**	**+22%**
C. Annual Loan Cost (deducted)	**119,979**	**119,979**	**187,395**	**+67,416**	**+2%**

Of the 6.1M UGX total income gain, the counterfactual model attributes approximately 3.3M (56%) to external factors (national price and yield trends) and 2.8M (44%) to program-associated effects above the market trend. Coffee revenue grew from 3.6M to 9.9M UGX, driven almost entirely by yield gains (+134%) and modest land expansion (+18%). Farmers' implied farm-gate prices were essentially flat (9,028 to 9,041 UGX/kg) despite national prices rising 70%, suggesting the program's income pathway operated through production volume, not price capture. Within coffee revenue, market price trends account for 24%, national yield trends for 22%, and the joint price-yield interaction for 9%.

The 44% program-associated share should therefore be read as a plausible modeled contribution, not a causal measurement. The counterfactual assumes national market trends represent the trajectory EALI farmers would have followed absent the program, which is a reasonable approximation but not a neutral assumption.

[7] Coffee costs rose 98% across the panel, tracking closely with yield gains (+134%) and consistent with program-induced investment in inputs and labor. The counterfactual holds baseline costs constant, which does not account for general input price inflation over the period. This makes the 44% program-attributed share a conservative estimate, since adjusting for input inflation would raise it.

Figure 9. Income Growth Attribution



If farmers were selected because they had higher growth potential, the figure overstates the program's contribution. If EALI farmers faced constraints that other farmers did not, it understates the program's role in enabling gains they could not have achieved independently. The direction of bias is not resolvable from this data, but the modeled share holds as a defensible estimate within the sample and bounds described above.

4.4 Partner Interventions

Under EALI, partners developed distinct delivery models to close the living income gap for different farmer segments. Agri Evolve built a decentralized hub network across the remote Rwenzori Arabica belt, combining house-to-house agronomy training with first-mile cherry purchasing and digital micro-lending through EMATA. Cafe Africa trained cohorts of rural youth to form private Business Units that sell fee-based agronomy services directly to farmers. IBERO, operating in the Robusta belt, provided integrated coffee buying, lending, and input provision. Table 6 summarizes the three models.

Table 6. Partner Business Models and Service Delivery Approaches

Partner	Target income drivers	Business model	Key partners & reach	Service delivery mechanism
Agri Evolve Rwenzori Arabica	Price, yield, cost of production, diversified income	Decentralized **Agri Hubs** led by trained promoter farmers (Agri Agents), with field officers delivering house-to-house agronomy training via tablet-based video animations in local languages. SAP Rural Sourcing Management app provides end-to-end digital traceability (farm polygons, product flow).	Smallholder households in remote villages; youth service teams (planting, cookstoves); women's VSLAs; local councils; **EMATA** (digital micro-loans for farm finance)	Hubs function as first-mile buying centers with transparent cherry pricing broadcast via toll-free lines, SMS, and megaphones, eliminating middlemen and reducing farmer vulnerability to informal traders during price dips. EMATA digital loans provide liquidity to avoid distress-selling.

Partner	Target income drivers	Business model	Key partners & reach	Service delivery mechanism
Cafe Africa Multi-district	Yield, diversified income	**Youth Coffee Service Provider (YCSP)** model: rural youth trained in cohorts to form private Business Units offering fee-based agronomy services (stumping, pruning, de-suckering, fertilizer application). Initially subsidized, then transitioning to commercial fees, creating a self-financing last-mile extension ecosystem.	Rural youth entrepreneurs (~150 BUs); traditional smallholder farmers (fee-paying clients); **BUCADEF, Mountain Harvest, LDC** (local implementers); UCDA (curriculum harmonization, national scale-up)	YCSPs equipped with smartphones and **CommCare** software to capture farm data, track treated trees, and generate invoices. Stepwise R&R model breaks complex agronomy into household-level demonstrations, backed by an open-source R&R Toolkit designed for adoption by any extension system.
IBERO Uganda *(NKG Bloom)* Robusta belt	Land size, yield, price	Farmer Services Unit (FSU) as **one-stop shop**: integrates coffee buying, customized multi-tier lending, input disbursement, and group training (financial literacy, gender, sustainability). Underpinned by a **$25M revolving credit facility** (European banks + USAID + IDH risk-sharing).	Smallholder Robusta farmers and farmer groups; **Nestlé Nespresso** (premium AAA offtake); European financial institutions, USAID, IDH (risk-sharing capital partners)	IT-enabled farmer credit profiles aggregate production capacity, delivery history, and repayment data, functioning as informal credit scores for smallholders who lack credit histories. Loans tailored to specific needs (inputs, land, machinery). Digital mobile money disbursements reduce transaction friction.

Farmers received a broad mix of services. Agronomic training was the most universally delivered, reaching 76.3% of farmers overall. Beyond that, partners diverged in ways that reflect their business models. IBERO led on inputs provision (around 46%), while Cafe Africa had the strongest delivery on farm rehabilitation and R&R services (41%). A third of farmers reported support from Agri Evolve and IBERO in accessing markets, consistent with their supply chain buying operations; Cafe Africa does not purchase coffee. In terms of financial services, Agri Evolve led on financial literacy (24%) and IBERO on savings and credit support (16%).

Figure 10. Type of Assistance Received Under EALI Program, Endline



Three-quarters of farmers reported being satisfied or very satisfied, while one in five expressed dissatisfactions, a signal of the quality of services delivered by implementing partners (Figure 11).

Figure 11. Satisfaction with Assistance or Services Received under the EALI program



Figure 12. Intervention Satisfaction: Recipients vs. Non-Recipients at Endline



Comparing satisfaction between farmers who received and did not receive a given intervention (see Figure 12), recipients reported significantly higher satisfaction with seven of the nine interventions. The highest satisfaction "premiums" were from savings and credit support, diversification, input provision, financial literacy and market access support. Agronomic training showed a positive overall effect but the widest range of satisfaction scores, suggesting variability in training quality across farmers. PO/cooperative support and linkages to service providers did not show significantly higher satisfaction among recipients. The interventions with the largest premiums address the most immediate constraints farmers face: limited access to capital, the need for diversified income to complement coffee revenue, and difficulty procuring farming inputs.

4.5 Perceived Contribution Score

This section complements the counterfactual analysis (Section 4.3) and panel income data (Section 4.2) with a farmer-reported perception measure. The score draws on the "contribution scores" approach developed by Ton, van Rijn, and Pamuk (2023), which treats beneficiary perceptions as primary evidence when observable performance indicators are noisy across heterogeneous contexts. The score combines two self-reported measures: (1) perceived income change over the program period, and (2) the degree to which farmers attribute that change to the EALI program. Multiplying the two components produces a joint score on a 0 to 1 scale. The analysis draws on the full endline sample (n=1,051 with valid responses).

The perception score asks how farmers themselves weigh the program's contribution. Income-based measurement has limits. Households make multi-year investments (stumping, replanting, intensification) that pay off over long horizons. Often, costs and benefits are not in cash, whether bartered or taking some other non-cash form. Asking farmers directly is a useful way to separate a farmer who reports a large income increase but credits external factors from a farmer who credits the program strongly but reports no change. Yet farmers who show limited income change within the reporting window may still report meaningful program contribution. Multiplying perceived change by perceived attribution captures the joint condition.

72.5% of endline farmers reported that household income had increased over the program period (56.9% reported an increase; 15.6% a substantial increase). A further 20.3% reported income stayed the same, while a small share (0.9% combined) reported declines. On attribution, 37.0% of respondents credited the EALI program with their income change (23.5% "quite a bit"; 13.5% "almost entirely"), while 26.4% attributed change "somewhat." The remaining respondents did not respond or reported minimal or no program contribution (20.6% "very little"; 9.8% "not at all").

Figure 13. Perceived Income Change and Program Contribution - Endline



The perceived contribution score has a mean of 0.32 and median of 0.25 on a 0-1 scale, with a standard deviation of 0.28. Over three-quarters of farmers (77.5%) registered a positive impact score, reflecting some perceived income improvement paired with at least partial attribution to the EALI program. The 14.4% scoring above 0.50 are farmers who reported both substantial income gains and strong program attribution.

Figure 14. Impact Score Distribution (n=1,051)



5. Evaluation Questions

This section presents the key findings of the evaluation, structured around the main evaluation questions, covering impact, effectiveness, relevance, efficiency, sustainability, coherence, and closing with a strategic learning section. Each subsection draws on both quantitative and qualitative evidence. Where the two sources converge, the finding is reported with confidence. Where they diverge, both are presented, with qualitative evidence used to explain the context or mechanism behind the quantitative pattern observed. Where the data tells different stories across farmer segments, regions, or gender, those differences are also reported directly.

Several methodological limitations affect the interpretation of results. First, the panel design is partial: only 403 of 1,157 endline farmers were matched to baseline, meaning income change estimates apply to a subset that may differ from the full sample. Second, there is no control group; counterfactual comparisons rely on national UCDA price and yield trends as a proxy for the no-program trajectory, which is a reasonable but unverifiable assumption. Third, all income figures are self-reported and subject to recall bias, particularly for non-coffee income components. Fourth, income distributions are highly skewed (skewness = 6.9); a small number of high-income outliers exert disproportionate influence on means and percentages. Fifth, baseline and endline benchmarks differ (Anker 2023 vs. 2025 estimates) due to data availability at the time of baseline collection. These limitations are discussed further in Annex 4.

5.1 Impact

I1. Is the Theory of Change validated by observed results?

Table 7. Theory of Change Validation

Level	Pathway 2: Act & Transform		
Impact	~ Mixed	29,500 coffee farming households in Kenya and Uganda increase their income by >35%	29,318 farmers were supported in the program. 19,057 (65.0%) reported an increased their income since baseline and 16,066 (54.8%) increased by >35%.
	~ Mixed	29,500 coffee farmers progressively moving toward earning a living income	Median household income of UGX 4.5 million. 13.1% above Anker benchmark. Despite, mean income growth of +134%, would require roughly quadrupling current median income.
Outcome	~ Mixed	Male, female and youth farmers experienced increased income from both coffee and non-coffee crops; however, this does not imply improvements in income stability.	Income gains of 111.7% for women and 119.3% for youth. Women still earn 54% of men in coffee. Youth reported largest relative benefits and contribution from EALI intervention.
	Limited evidence	Improved re-distribution of value and risk within the supply chain	The study did not capture value distribution across the coffee supply chain to validate this outcome (outside scope).
	✓ Confirmed	Sustainable improvements on multiple income drivers	Improvements in multiple drivers explained improvements in household incomes (by weight): Yield (28%), Land Size (28%), Price (16%), Cost (13%), Diversification (13%).
	✓ Confirmed	Improved adoption of sustainable practices	99.6% of farmers adopted GAP practices, including 65% classified as sustainable (shade trees, water conservation, organic fertilizer, etc.) for the first time.
	✓ Confirmed	Increased yields and number of crops intercropped with coffee	Yield more than doubled (506 to 1,186 kg/ha, +134%) from baseline. Diversified income grew +31.3% overall, with income from other crops growing +48.4%
Output	~ Mixed	New sourcing/procurement contracts integrate living income aspects	Buyer relationships for direct partners improved (58.5% "better"), driven by trust, transparency, and quality premiums (compliant farmers received premiums). No evidence of LI integration in pricing contracts beyond EALI partners.
	✓ Confirmed	Service delivery models linked to multiple income drivers rolled out at scale and meeting needs of farmers, service providers and brands	29,318 enrolled (99.4%). GAP 76.3%, inputs 46.1%, R&R 27.2%. Mean 2.2 services per farmer. 75.3% satisfied. 72.5% farmers report income increase; 63.4% attribute it to EALI.

Activity	✓ Confirmed	Companies/brands develop and adopt strategies to close living income gaps and to report on progress	Three partners each with distinct LI-closing strategies: Agri-Evolve (decentralized hubs), Cafe Africa (youth business units), and IBERO (FSU and revolving credit). No evidence of scale outside direct partnerships.
	~ Mixed	Transform policy and value chain structure aspects to create/improve equitable distribution of value and risk	IDH convened EUDR task forces and co-drafted the national EUDR roadmap. LI concept normalized in both country sectors. Broader structural transformation not yet achieved.
	✓ Confirmed	Co-invest in design, funding and roll out of initiatives and projects integrating strategies and actions to close LI gaps through multiple income drivers	Four core interventions (GAP, credit, inputs, management/financial literacy) positive across all farmer segments. Co-investment confirmed by EALI partners.

Level	Pathway 1: Convene & Align		
Impact	Limited evidence	>80% FOB price of coffee is received by farmers at Farm-Gate in Kenya and Uganda	Not measured. No farm-gate price as percentage of FOB data collected. This is a data gap in the evaluation design.
Outcome	✓ Confirmed	Collective learning on working and effective strategies to close income gaps	IDH convened sector actors through UCP and KCP over three years, normalizing LI concept and introducing measurement tools (Income Driver Calculator, benchmarks).
	~ Mixed	Increased transparency on the flow of value and risk within the supply chain	LI benchmarks established, segmentation methodology developed, panel data collected. Transparency improved at farmer end; through supply chain middle not measured.
Output	~ Mixed	Commitments by stakeholders to act on sector priority approaches/actions with greatest impact on closing LI gaps	EUDR drove broader compliance commitments, but these reflect market-access risk, not LI commitment. Three direct partners committed, no evidence beyond them.
	✓ Confirmed	LI measurement analyses done and verified data available to support initiatives	LI benchmarks established (Fairtrade LIRP, Anker/SHIFT, CPI-adjusted). Two benchmarking methods applied (flat, adult equivalence). Panel data collected in this survey.
Activity	✓ Confirmed	Convene/engage multi-stakeholders and lead/support living income initiatives and agreement on commitment to action	IDH convened UCP and KCP. EUDR task force formation independently attributed to platform by government respondents. National Data Warehouse brokered in Uganda. Kenya EUDR roadmap co-drafted.
	✓ Confirmed	Share/co-create technical tools (benchmarks, reference prices, methodology for farmer segmentation and income measurement, etc.).	Income Driver Calculator, LI benchmarks, segmentation methodology, Power BI dashboard (Kenya), EUDR one-pager, open-source R&R Toolkit, Master Trainer curriculum. Tools used and independently referenced.

I2. To what extent has awareness of Living Income and EU regulations influenced stakeholder behavior?

Qualitative evidence indicates that awareness of EU regulations, particularly the EU Deforestation Regulation (EUDR), has strongly influenced stakeholder behavior. EU regulations are tied to market access and compliance risk, which creates immediate commercial incentives for action. Living income awareness, by contrast, has primarily influenced how stakeholders frame sustainability challenges and farmer prosperity, with fewer examples of sectoral change.

To structure this analysis, we trace how stakeholder move along a behavioral continuum (awareness → understanding → consideration → early adoption → maturity) and test the causal mechanisms linking program activities to observed changes. This lens is aligned with the program's *convene and align* actions, assessing how increased awareness translates into concrete behavioral change across groups and levels (individual firms vs. sector-wide dynamics).

Figure 15. Living Income Behavior Change Continuum



Prior to EALI, the concept of Living Income had limited presence in each country's coffee sector. In Kenya, the concept was confused with a basic minimum wage. In Uganda, communities perceived it as linked to sensitive topics like child labor. IDH's contribution was to bring structure, tools, and measurement and to relate Living Income to problems the sector was already trying to articulate, such as a lack of farmer voice and representation or low profitability of coffee farming.

Some of the specific milestones achieved include the developing the Income Driver Calculator, conducting proof-of-concept pilots with grant recipients (Ibero, Cafe Africa, Agri Evolve), translation of LI into locally resonant language (*pesa mfukoni*, meaning "money in the pocket"), and integration of LI principles into the 2023 Kenya Coffee Sustainability Manual.

Coffee platforms: from awareness to sector-level understanding and consideration

The coffee platforms show the clearest progress on Living Income. In both countries, they have translated concepts, structured discussions, and aligned stakeholders around shared interpretations. A Ugandan stakeholder explained that Living Income "*has been normalized because of the various convening meetings that have been held… the better way of communication in terms of how Living Income can be integrated into the coffee story."* The platforms contribution has been to broker knowledge and shape agendas. However, the same respondent also flagged

a limitation that *"Living income requires extra compliance… and if it can be avoided, most of these businessmen will take that option,"* reinforcing the need for strong incentives.

The platform has set-up committees, or task forces, covering thematic areas including Living Income and EUDR. Through these bodies, Living Income has come up repeatedly at platform convenings at national and subnational levels, drawing in cooperatives, farm organizations, districts and extensionists. This has built familiarity with the concept without producing coordinated action or formal commitments yet. Other stakeholders describe the EUDR taskforce, "rebirthed through the platforms," as a national coordination mechanism for EUDR and CSDDD compliance, with Living Income sitting largely outside its formal scope. Living Income is therefore advancing through discussion and framing in platform spaces, but is not yet been embedded in operational or regulatory mechanisms.

Government actors: from awareness to partial institutional response

Government responses diverge by country. In Uganda, a government respondent stated that *"It was actually the coffee platform that rebirthed the EUDR task force,"* which suggests that awareness contributed to a concrete coordination response. The Uganda Coffee Platform brokered consensus for a centralized National Data Warehouse when individual exporters had begun building proprietary farmer databases. The platform's argument, that no buyer owns farmers who are free to sell to anyone, was the basis for a shared system with interoperable APIs and multiple approved apps. In Kenya, the change is better described as improved alignment, as noted one Kenyan government actor who explained that *"the platform acts as a bridge between the public sector and the private sector."* KCP engaged the Coffee Executive Council (CEC) to integrate county governments into EUDR planning, IDH helped draft the national compliance roadmap, and New KPCU shipped the first EUDR-compliant container to Poland.

Government actors in both countries show a movement from awareness to understanding, and in some cases to institutional consideration and partial action, especially around EU regulations. This indicates movement into early adoption, at least in institutional terms, since awareness was translated into some policy action or strengthening of a formal response mechanism.

Private sector actors: strongest movement where commercial incentives are immediate

Among private sector actors, the funnel is most advanced for EU regulations. A Uganda exporter reported: *"We have been able to be agile by adopting new regulations. The most recent was EUDR that led to a consortium that has helped Uganda as a country map close to over 1 million farmers."* This describes not only awareness but active participation in coordinated operational response.

For Living Income, IDH introduced the Income Driver Calculator and convened sector actors over three years, expecting firms to redesign sourcing and pricing. Despite these efforts, the evaluation found no named non-partner private sector buyer outside direct partners that changed its sourcing contract or pricing model. Behavioral change traceable to LI awareness is confirmed only among direct grant recipients (Ibero, Cafe Africa, Agri Evolve). These changes are better attributed to the partnership relationship with EALI than to awareness alone. In Kenya, a private sector actor stated that *"Living Income is something that should be considered by everyone that is working with farmers,"* while another noted that *"Slowly the companies are taking on Living Income as part of core business or what I would say sustainability initiatives."* Another actor directly involved with

the platform also confirmed that buyers are not making forward-looking contracts referencing a living income.

It should be noted at least three external factors help explain the low conversion:

- First, Kenya's auction system architecture (approximately 90% of coffee sold through the Nairobi Coffee Exchange) means that buyers evaluate prices in hindsight and cannot guarantee a living income floor through forward contracts,
- Second, Kenya's vertical divestment reforms during the program period caused a two-month licensing freeze, a 30% price crash, and forced multinationals to shut down farmer-facing extension programs, undermining incentives to commit to Living Income,
- Third, without regulatory action, LI adoption remains voluntary for firms who tend to see it as "extra compliance" and a cost to avoid.

Alternatively, where respondents link compliance to continued market access, particularly to the E.U., there is indication that awareness of Living Income might translate into adoption, particularly in Uganda, where there are fewer structural constraints. The concept is still early in sustainability thinking and just starting to influence how firms frame their responsibilities.

Farmers and cooperatives: suggestive evidence

In Kenya, the KCP developed a Power BI dashboard that translated NCE auction data into factory-level summaries shared with farmers ahead of cooperative payouts. While evidence on the scale of adoption is limited within the scope of this evaluation, qualitative findings suggest that the tool has contributed to improving transparency and farmer awareness of price distribution. In specific cases, such as Mutira and Baricho cooperatives, farmers reportedly acted on this information by voting out their boards after identifying disparities in payout structures (with one cooperative returning approximately 95% of revenues to farmers, compared to others paying the minimum 20%). These examples illustrate how improved access to pricing data can strengthen accountability and influence governance dynamics at cooperative level.

In Uganda, the UCP has focused on embedding knowledge within existing public systems, including training UCDA "Master Trainers" to integrate Living Income and EUDR concepts into the public extension system, and developing simplified communication materials to translate complex regulatory requirements for farmers. While direct evidence of farmer-level uptake remains limited within this evaluation, private sector stakeholders indicate that such efforts have contributed to increasing engagement across different levels of the system: *"We've seen more engagement… we've seen the last mile farmer being involved… and multiple levels of stakeholders being involved."*

More broadly, stakeholders highlight that improved access to information and dialogue is beginning to influence how actors understand and respond to sector challenges: *"It removes any ambiguity amongst different people, and it also allows for people feel their interests have been… feel that their voices have been listened to."*

Table 8. Evidence assessment

Causal link	Status	Assessment
Platform dialogue shifted sector understanding of the Living Income concept	Confirmed	Before EALI, Living Income had no presence in either country's sector. Platform convening normalized the concept through translation into locally resonant language (*pesa mfukoni*), workshops, and the Income Driver Calculator. A Ugandan stakeholder confirmed it "*has been normalized because of the various convening meetings*."
Platform dialogue changed firm sourcing or pricing behavior	Not evidenced	No non-partner buyer changed its sourcing contract or pricing model as a result of platform engagement. Behavioral change is confirmed only among direct grant recipients (Ibero, Cafe Africa, Agri Evolve), which is better attributed to the partnership relationship. Structural barriers reinforce this issue in Kenya (auction system, vertical divestment reforms and 'extra compliance' mindset among firms).
Transparency tools enabled cooperative accountability	Plausible, unconfirmed	KCP built a Power BI dashboard translating NCE auction data. Farmers at Mutira and Baricho cooperatives reportedly voted out boards after discovering payout disparities. No documented evidence links the dashboard directly to governance action. Only two cases named.
Farmer voice reached formal policy processes	Not yet evidenced	IDH funded legal counsel enabling the Coffee Estate Producers Association to present clause-by-clause feedback on the Coffee Bill to the Kenyan Senate. Comments were entered into the official Hansard. No specific regulation was modified, blocked, or amended as a result.
Norm shifting through sustainability standards	Minimal	The 2023 Kenya Coffee Sustainability Manual was updated to embed LI principles as a dialogue and awareness tool. Described as one of the biggest tools the platform has developed. New KPCU's extension champions provide a plausible delivery mechanism. No evidence of adoption by cooperatives, extension providers, or independent firms.

Limits to the operationalization of Living Income Living Income has become a recognized concept in coffee sector discourse in Kenya and Uganda. EALI's work with coffee platforms translated the concept, introduced measurement tools, and piloted it through direct grant recipients. But the concept is more often reflected in how stakeholders articulate priorities and frame farmer outcomes than in concrete adjustments to sourcing, pricing, or service provision. No non-partner firm changed sourcing or pricing behaviors, and no regulations or certification requirements have emerged to codify Living Income in contracts or standards. The broader pattern is that behavioral change follows market and regulatory incentives. In contexts where stakeholders do not perceive a direct commercial or regulatory driver, movement beyond awareness and consideration remains limited.

Box 1. Stakeholder perceptions of the coffee platform as a sector convener

Stakeholders consistently perceive the Coffee Platform as a valuable space for **dialogue, coordination, and information exchange**, particularly in bringing together diverse actors and improving mutual understanding across the value chain.

A government stakeholder emphasized its growing strategic role: *"It has become more of a very purposeful vehicle to listen to each other and really hold ourselves accountable and then make decision on which direction the coffee industry should take."*

Similarly, private sector actors highlighted its role in improving alignment and reducing misunderstandings: *"It removes any ambiguity amongst different people, and it also allows for people feel their interests have been […] feel that their voices have been listened to."*

However, stakeholders also consistently note that the platform's strength lies more in coordination than in driving collective action. As one industry stakeholder reflected: *"It's really a talk shop […] coordination, but it's not so much collaboration."*

In addition, some actors (particularly farmer representatives) highlight ongoing challenges related to inclusiveness and influence: *"Discussions tend to favor the multinationals and the donors… most policies are made centrally, and the only farmers who are able to access national-level discussions are those who have offices within the capital."*

Overall, the platform is seen as a strong convening mechanism, but with more limited effectiveness in translating dialogue into joint action and equitable participation across stakeholders.

I3. What are the most significant changes in income levels and stability for different farmer segments (by gender, age, region, partner), and what are the most effective and relevant strategies to close living income gaps for each of these segments?

We tested ten demographic and farm-level variables for significant differences in median household income at endline. Nine of ten showed statistically significant differences. Land size was the strongest predictor, with farmers cultivating more than one hectare earning 2.8x the median of those with one hectare or less (UGX 8.6 million vs. 3.1 million). Coffee type, gender, and marital status also showed large gaps. Age was the only non-significant variable.

Table 9. Income Differences by Farmer Segment

Endline median household income (UGX/yr), n=1,157

Variable	Group	n	Median	Group	n	Median	Sig.
Land size	Small (≤1 ha)	795	3.1M	Large (>1 ha)	362	8.6M	<0.001 ***
Gender	Female	462	3.0M	Male	695	5.5M	<0.001 ***
Coffee type	Arabica	451	3.0M	Robusta	706	5.4M	<0.001 ***
Marital status	Not married	253	2.5M	Married	904	5.0M	<0.001 ***
Education	Primary	860	3.8M	Secondary	289	5.9M	<0.001 ***
Region	Western	549	3.5M	Central	608	5.2M	0.002 **
Partner tenure	2023-2025	506	3.9M	Pre-2023	651	4.7M	0.002 **
Cooperative	No	267	3.8M	Yes	890	4.5M	0.037 *
Age group	Youth (<35)	143	4.2M	Adult (≥35)	1,013	4.4M	0.683 **ns**

*Sorted by significance. *** p<0.001 ** p<0.01 * p<0.05 ns = not significant. Mann-Whitney U.*

Differences by land size and gender

Many of these variables overlap with each other. Female farmers tend to have smaller plots. Arabica farmers tend to be in the Western region. Some partners firms tend to work with larger farms. To identify which characteristics actually drive income levels, we ran a statistical test that considers all ten variables. Two stand out: land size mattered most and gender matters second. Once those two are accounted for, none of the other variables add meaningful explanation. That said, who a farmer is only goes so far in explaining what they earn. Characteristics like gender, age, and region, account for less than 4% of the variation in household income across the sample.

Figure 16. Farmer segments by land size and gender

Median endline income (UGX/yr), n=1,157.



Two-thirds of the sample farm less than a hectare. On plots that small, coffee alone cannot get a household to a living income: smallholder medians sit between UGX 2.7 to 3.8 million, well below the threshold. Farmers above one hectare earn two to four times more and are much more likely to achieve the threshold. Every group's income rose over the program period, but the percentage gains look different from the absolute ones. While women on farms above 1 hectare achieved the highest income gains by percentage, interviews indicate that does not necessarily translate into stronger decision-making and control over income:

"We are involved in the work, but when the coffee is sold, the money is not always ours to decide on." - Female farmer, Rwenzori

Women face additional constraints in access to land, inputs, and finance, limiting their ability to independently scale production. In absolute terms, women's median household income (UGX 3.0 million) is 55% of men's (UGX 5.5 million), and women are half as likely to reach the Anker/SHIFT living income threshold (7.6% against 16.7%). Savings group participation appears to support improved access to liquidity but does not shift the underlying gender dynamics. More discussion on the gender differences in outcomes for women and youth is discussed below.

Differences by coffee type and region

Coffee type is the next most important grouping after land size and gender. Arabica farmers earn less than robusta farmers, but they gained more during the program period because they started from a lower base. The regional picture has similar layers. At endline, farmers in Central Uganda

earn more than farmers in the Western region. Over the program period, though, Western farmers gained far more. Stakeholders also describe a more dynamic local economy in Central Uganda with stronger buyer and market linkages. Farmers in Central more frequently report being able to time sales and negotiate with buyers. In Rwenzori, income gains are more constrained, more volatile, and more mediated by both market and social factors.

"Where there are buyers nearby, farmers benefit more. In remote areas, even good production does not translate into income." – Stakeholder

Differences by age

At endline, youth and adults earn about the same. Age was the one grouping in Table 9 where we did not find a meaningful difference in current income. The panel data tells a different story. Youth incomes grew faster than adult incomes. Youth started from a lower base and caught up. In addition, focus group discussion with youth identified distinct constraints. Youth engagement tends to focus on services like spraying, transport, and trading rather than primary production, because youth typically have less access to land and capital:

"Before, there was nothing for us. Now at least we can earn something through services, even if it is not enough yet." - Male youth, Central Uganda

Income stability

Income stability matters as much as income level, especially for farmers near or below the living income threshold. A single bad season can set a vulnerable farmer back for years. At endline, the widest income ranges appear among farmers whose personal circumstances limit their access to resources and decision-making authority. Female farmers and farmers with less than a secondary education experienced the most income instability Female farmers' incomes are about 20% more spread out than men's, measured by typical income for the group. Being a higher earner does not automatically mean having a more stable income. The breadth of personal circumstances reiterates how income risk is shaped by a broader set of factors than coffee farming alone.

What Farmer's Perceive Works for Them

We use self-reported contribution scores to assess the effectiveness of interventions for different segments (see Table 10). Perception is a useful signal to handle the noise of income change, but it is also shaped by factors beyond income (visibility, expectations, social desirability). For this reason, consider the quantitative findings here indicative rather than definitive.

Eight partner interventions showed meaningful differences in farmer's perceived impact. Four of these (GAP training, credit and financial services, input support, and management and financial literacy training) registered positive across every segment and appear to be the core building blocks. Diversification produced the largest pooled effect, though its impacts were more uneven across segments. Farm rehabilitation and R&R did not reach significance in the pooled sample but showed strong effects in the Arabica/Western segment. Smaller-scale interventions such as digital tools, gender-focused activities, certification, and support to producer organizations had more limited reach and weaker associations with income scores.

Table 10. Perceived Contribution Score by Intervention

Differences in farmer-reported impact scores between those who received each intervention and those who did not. Scores reflect farmers' own assessments of livelihood effects, not directly measured income change.

Intervention			Impact Score			
Description	N	Reach	Received	Did Not	Difference	Significance
Diversification	81	7.7%	0.500	0.250	+0.238	***
GAP training*	**832**	**79.2%**	**0.250**	**0.125**	**+0.185**	***
Credit/finance*	**145**	**13.8%**	**0.375**	**0.250**	**+0.152**	***
Input support*	**516**	**49.1%**	**0.375**	**0.250**	**+0.132**	***
Mgmt/fin literacy*	**190**	**18.1%**	**0.375**	**0.250**	**+0.119**	***
Certification	11	1.0%	0.375	0.250	+0.116	**
Market access	266	25.3%	0.375	0.250	+0.071	***
Gender-focused	24	2.3%	0.375	0.250	+0.064	*

Core interventions that have a positive impact across all farmer segments

Equal exposure does not mean equal benefit

Receiving an intervention does not mean benefiting from it equally. Women and men accessed EALI partner interventions at similar rates but not with equal returns. Women reported lower perceived impact across interventions. The income data match: women's median income is 55% of men's, and 7.6% of women reach the Anker threshold against 16.7% of men. Gender constraints outside the interventions shape women's returns: control over household income, time use, and authority over how training, credit, and inputs are used. For youth, it is the opposite. Their incomes roughly doubled over the program period, and they reported stronger perceived impact from credit and input support. Youth start with less capital and fewer market relationships, so relaxing those constraints produces outsized returns.

Priority levers by segment

Table 11 lists the interventions associated with income outcomes for each segment, drawing on perceived impact from Table 10 and observed income patterns where available. Because segmentation explains only a small share of total income variation, the table should be read as directional priorities for program design, not as quantified estimates of intervention effects.

Table 11. Strongest Levers by Farmer Segment

Segment	Strongest Levers for Income Uplift
Women (n=424)	Diversification, GAP training, input support, and credit/finance remain the strongest levers, but each produces a smaller impact score for women than for men. Closing this gap requires complementary interventions that address the structural barriers limiting women's ability to translate program services into income gains.
Youth under 35 (n=130)	Credit/finance and input support show the largest contributions for younger farmers, who tend to have fewer assets and less established market relationships. Once those constraints are relaxed, youth see larger impacts than older cohorts from the same interventions. Few youth

Segment	Strongest Levers for Income Uplift
	accessed diversification support, so no meaningful difference could be discerned for that intervention.
Arabica/Western region (n=418)	This is the only segment where farm rehabilitation and R&R produced a significant difference in income scores. Market access and diversification also showed larger impacts in this region, consistent with the fact that the Rwenzori arabica market has fewer buyers, more price volatility, and less established commercial infrastructure than robusta zones.
Small farmers, 1 hectare or less (n=715)	Diversification had nearly twice the impact on smallholders as on larger farmers. Non-coffee income sources compensate for what land constraints make impossible through yield improvement alone. This pattern was especially pronounced for female smallholders.
Newer farmers, joined 2023 or later (n=448)	Market access produced the largest gains for newer farmers, who have not yet built the buyer relationships that more tenured participants already hold. Diversification and management training followed, suggesting that risk management matters most in the early stages of a farmer's engagement with the program, before other interventions can take hold.

5.2 Effectiveness

ES1. How effectively were intervention strategies tailored to baseline-identified farm segments and achieved intended outcomes?

Section 4.4 describes the three implementing partner models and intervention types. Section I3 covers income variation by segment and intervention effectiveness on income outcomes. This section focuses on the tailoring of program design and intermediate outcomes: changes in farmer behavior, market relationships, and access to capital, and delivery channels.

Overall, the EALI program achieved broad, positive intermediate outcomes across most dimensions. The links between interventions and behaviors changes were logical, inputs provision drove fertilizer adoption, R&R support increased stumping, and access to credit unlocked investment in soil conservation. However, evidence of deliberate tailoring to baseline-identified segments was limited. Where differentiation did occur, it was through partner-model design choices and geography, not as much through baseline categories like gender and land size.

Partner-model Differentiation

Partners delivered substantively different intervention bundles. IBERO operated a primarily inputs-and-GAP model (86% reached with inputs, 81% with GAP training). Cafe Africa emphasized farm rehabilitation and R&R (41% versus 24% for Agri-Evolve and 18% for IBERO), with a lighter touch on inputs, credit, and market access. Agri-Evolve concentrated on market access, credit, and agronomic training, with low inputs provision (16%).

Table 12. Partner intervention bundles (material differences only)

Intervention	Agri-Evolve	Cafe Africa	IBERO	Spread (pp)
Inputs provided	15.6%	36.6%	85.9%	70.3
Market access support	31.1%	6.1%	32.7%	26.6
Farm rehab and R&R	24.0%	41.3%	17.6%	23.7
GAP training	84.9%	63.1%	80.9%	21.8
Savings and credit	16.6%	5.0%	16.1%	11.6
Financial literacy	23.5%	16.8%	13.4%	10.1

Evidence of deliberate tailoring to baseline-identified farm segments was limited. Gender showed no material differences across any of the twelve intervention types. Land size showed one: large landholders received inputs at 60% versus 40% for smallholders. Coffee type looks differentiated on inputs (41 pp gap) but this is largely a partner issue, since IBERO concentrated in robusta.

In terms of intervention intensity, farmers received a mean of 2.24 interventions. Large landholders received more interventions than smallholders (mean 2.55 vs 2.10), longer-tenured farmers received more than newer ones (2.51 vs 1.89), and IBERO farmers received more than Cafe Africa or Agri-Evolve farmers (2.65 vs 1.94 and 2.14). None of these reflect a response to baseline segmentation, but rather the absorptive capacity of farmers and partner model.

As a result, longer-tenured farmers outperformed shorter-enrolled farmers across every outcome measured. Gender and age showed no significant difference in GAP adoption. Large landholders reported better input and finance access than small farm households, a gap the program did not close. The overall pattern is consistent with stronger outcomes among more resourced and longer-enrolled farmers, with smaller producers remaining underserved.

Business Model and Structural Changes

The partner implementation models created changes in the conditions through which farmers accessed markets, gained knowledge and secured capital to expand their coffee farming.

Buyer relationships and market channels.

Farmers use three marketing channels: 62% route all coffee through formal direct channels (cooperative or company processor), 23% route all through middlemen (local collector, trading center), and 15% use both. Middleman use varies by partner. Agri-Evolve farmers use middlemen most (44% any use, 33% exclusively). IBERO farmers use them least exclusively (7%).

Seventy-eight percent of farmers reported at least one change in their buyer relationship since 2023. Of farmers who reported changes, 59% rated the relationship as "better," 38% mixed and 2% worse (the rest did not respond). The most commonly reported changes were price (43%), reliability (42%), trust (34%), and transparency (32%). Trust and transparency are associated with the most positive perceptions (69% and 68% "better"), while changes in sales channel alone produced more ambiguous results (42% "better," 52% "mixed"). The relational conditions under which farmers feel treated fairly matter more to their assessment than changes in who buys or

how product moves. Farmers who combine direct and middleman channels reported best outcomes, which suggests direct channels deliver training and premium access while middlemen provide liquidity, and farmers who combine both access more of each.

Buyer relationships appear to be an important enabler for quality premiums, but the relationship is not automatic. Farmers who reported quality compliance changes receive premiums at nearly twice the rate of those who did not (57% vs. 30%), suggesting the premium pathway runs through new compliance requirements rather than buyer relationships alone.

Input access. 62 percent of farmers reported no change in input access at all. Cost is the binding constraint (67% cite "too expensive" as the primary GAP adoption barrier) and the program does not directly address input prices. Among the 38% of farmers who reported changes, 62 to 69% rated improvements in access, source, payment terms, and advice, but this applies to a minority of the population. Input price volatility remains the primary friction point from farmer perspectives. Agro-dealers are the predominant input source (55%), followed by buyers (25%).

Access to finance. Half of farmers accessed credit. Of all farmers, 46% rated finance access as better and 38% reported no real change. Only 2% rated it worse. Outcomes depended on lender type. Cooperative and buyer-linked credit, which tie loan repayment to coffee output, produced the strongest outcomes (84% and 81% "better"). VSLA (66%), SACCOS (65%), and PDM parish (65%) sit in the middle. Informal sources performed worst: relatives and friends at 41%, money lenders at 40%. Farmers who directed funds toward coffee inputs or renovation reported 78 to 80% better ratings; those who used loans for household needs reported only 59%.

Loan size varied by an order of magnitude across lenders. The population median was UGX 900,000. VSLA (UGX 500,000 median) and cooperative (UGX 800,000) sit at the lower end. SACCOS, buyer-linked, and PDM parish each sit at UGX 1.0 million median. Commercial banks reached UGX 5.0 million median but only for 27 farmers, who likely had asset collateral. Loan amounts vary by segment: larger landholders borrowed UGX 1.15 million median versus UGX 600,000 for smallholders, and male borrowers UGX 1.0 million versus UGX 700,000 for female borrowers. Cooperative members received savings and credit interventions at 15% compared to 5% for non-members, a 3.1x gap, and the best-performing lender types (cooperative and buyer-linked credit) are tied to farmers who are members and sell through cooperatives.

Service providers. Paid service uptake is low at 16%, but within that group, 85% used a youth provider. The services youth deliver focus on input application (64%) and transport (32%). Only 5% of youth-provided services involve extension, compared to 30% for non-youth providers. Youth are primarily functioning as delivery and logistics agents in the EALI program, consistent with Cafe Africa's Business Unit model, achieving scale without yet reaching advisory depth.

Advisory services. Cooperative staff (28%), buyer agents (23%), and buyer employees (23%) provide most of the technical contact. This gives the program reach but concentrates advisory influence within relationships where the scope of advice is shaped partly by what buyers and cooperatives need farmers to do. There is a trade-off between coverage and effectiveness. Government extension and agro-input dealers are associated with higher mean GAP practices applied per farmer reached (8.9 and 7.5 respectively, against a trained-farmer mean of 6.7) but are cited by far fewer farmers (11% and 3% of those trained). Cooperatives are the main advisory platform but are associated with lower practice counts.

Behavioral Changes.

Behavioral change is most evident among direct program participants, with more limited and uneven spillover to the wider farmer population. An implementing partner from Central Robusta (Uganda) said: *"The project targeted only 3,000 farmers, but we work with more than 20,000 farmers... others will not know how good it is to live in a living income model"*.

Trained farmers applied a mean of 6.7 GAP practices out of 17 and report 5.9 practices started or improved because of EALI. Adoption varies by land size, partner, region, tenure, cooperative affiliation, and education (Mann-Whitney and Kruskal-Wallis $p<0.01$ across each dimension), but not by gender or age. Trained farmers are disproportionately cooperative members (79% vs 69% among untrained), which partly confounds the cooperative-adoption association.

Where diffusion beyond direct beneficiaries occurs, it appears to be informal and localized primarily through peer-to-peer learning channels rather than structured mechanisms. As a smallholder farmer participating in a FDG explained: *"When we learn these practices, we also tell our neighbors so they can also improve their coffee gardens".*

Overall, while there is strong evidence of behavioral change among those directly reached, current evidence suggests that spillover effects remain modest, context-specific, and not consistently observed across locations.

Table 13. Behavioral Changes Across Stakeholder Segments

Theme	Key Findings	Segment Differences	Illustrative Quotes
Improved farm management practices	Trained farmers apply a median of 6 GAP practices out of 17 and attribute a median of 5 as started or improved because of EALI. Pruning (88%), weeding (79%), selective harvest (59%), and soil and water conservation (53%) are most widely applied.	Stronger absolute adoption in Central (Robusta); 7.2 practices applied and 5.1 attributed to EALI, versus 5.6 applied and 4.4 attributed in Western Uganda (Arabica).	*"I request more people to be trained in better agricultural practices like tree stamping, fertilizer application and mulching… those who got the training have seen the difference in as far as income from coffee is concerned."* (FGD – Smallholder farmers, Mixed, Rwenzori Arabica)
Investment in inputs	Increased willingness to invest in inputs, particularly fertilizers, though constrained by affordability and availability.	Cost is reported equally across genders. Women are +10 pp labor barriers (+10 pp more likely to cite labor and time shortages as a barrier. Input access barriers do not differ by gender.	*"We now know that fertilizer is important for the coffee trees, but sometimes we fail to apply it because it is not available in our area."* (FGD – Women smallholder farmers, Female, Central Robusta)
Technical Advise Seeking	Farmers increasingly seek advice from trained service providers. Cooperatives are the leading channel (35%), followed by buyer agents (29%) and buyer extension staff (28%).	Youth coffee service providers reach 17% of trained farmers. Youth benefit through both employment and knowledge transfer roles.	*"The support we received helped a lot and we have seen tremendous change… there is a change among the farmers we visited."* (FGD – Youth service providers/field contractors, Male, Central Robusta)

Theme	Key Findings	Segment Differences	Illustrative Quotes
	Youth service providers report improved skills, confidence, and engagement with farmers.		
Knowledge diffusion (spillovers)	Limited evidence of peer-to-peer sharing beyond direct beneficiaries. Untrained farmers apply 5.2 practices versus 6.7 for trained, but a matched comparison would be needed to separate spillover from selection.	More visible in areas with stronger program exposure.	*"When we learn these practices, we also tell our neighbors so they can also improve their coffee gardens."* (FGD – Smallholder farmers, Mixed, Rwenzori Arabica)

Constraints on Intermediate Outcomes

Cost is the dominant barrier to GAP adoption by a wide margin. Sixty-eight percent of farmers cite expense as the primary constraint, more than double the next highest barrier (labor and time at 32%, lack of tools at 30%). Knowledge gaps rank near the bottom at 12%, and input unavailability at 4%. Labor and time is the one barrier with a statistically significant gender gap (women +10pp vs men, $p<0.001$), which points toward labor-saving services as a relevant gender-responsive intervention.

Figure 17. Adoption Barriers



To note, the current loan sizes are broadly adequate for the input and labor intensification that drove the yield gains, considering the average farmer's costs rose UGX 710K from baseline. The opportunity is expanding access to loans with repayment terms that work. Cooperative and buyer-linked credit produce the strongest outcomes because repayment is tied to coffee output and production cycles. Renovation is the exception, since stumping needs 3 to 5 years of foregone production, which is a different product than current working-capital credit.

ES2. To what extent did the Program address gender inequalities and youth inclusion?

The program made meaningful progress in improving gender inclusion and youth participation, particularly in terms of access to knowledge, participation in coffee-related activities. However, progress remains uneven, with constraints related to land access, financial control, and social norms limiting women's economic autonomy and youth's access to productive assets.

The analysis combines qualitative and quantitative evidence to assess changes in gender inclusion and youth participation. While consistent patterns of change are observed across data sources, the evaluation does not support disaggregation of outcomes by individual intervention pathways, as multiple program components were implemented concurrently.

Improvements in women's participation, roles, and economic engagement

The evaluation found evidence of increased participation of women in coffee production and related activities, with women increasingly engaging beyond traditionally assigned roles. Throughout focus group discussions, respondents described a shift toward more equal involvement in farming tasks, with women actively participating in planting, input application, and marketing activities. However, increased participation in these tasks does not necessarily reflect equivalent control over income or resources. These changes were most commonly associated with a combination of program-supported interventions, including training and increased access to knowledge, financial resources, and productive opportunities.

This shift is illustrated by women farmers participating in a Focus Group Discussion in the Central Robusta region, who explained: **"***In the past our role was to dry and pick coffee, but now we plant, prune, weed, harvest apply fertilizer and even sell, there is now no difference between work for men and for women we are all one*.**"**

These changes are linked to increased access to training and knowledge, which strengthens women's confidence and technical capacity. Training, alongside participation in farmer groups and savings groups, enables women to engage more actively and independently in coffee farming. There is also evidence of improvements in women's empowerment, particularly through access to savings and credit mechanisms. These changes have translated into broader livelihood improvements, including the ability to meet household needs and invest in productive activities.

Quantitative data points in two directions. On self-reported measures, women describe substantial gains in voice: 97.2% of women agree their views are taken into account in important farm and income decisions, and qualitative data describe shifts in task participation and household discussion. On measures of economic security, only 71.6% of women report meeting basic household needs (vs. 80.0% of men, $p < 0.001$), and 38.8% report the capacity to manage unexpected major expense (vs. 53.5% of men, $p < 0.001$). Women's self-efficacy also lags behind men at 72.0% (vs. 82.7% of men, $p < 0.001$). This suggests that while voice has increased, women's ability to mobilize resources and absorb shocks, has moved less.

A woman farmer participating in a Focus Group Discussion in Central Robusta highlighted how access to Village Savings and Loan Associations (VSLAs) has improved her financial autonomy: **"***Women now have access to money […] I quickly request for a loan in my VSLA which allows me to contribute to my family expenses*.**"**

Shifts in intra-household dynamics and decision-making

The gap between voice and material agency is closely tied to household-level power dynamics. The EALI program has contributed to gradual shifts in women's involvement in decision-making related to coffee production, through training, group membership, and savings access. In some cases, respondents reported more collaborative decision processes within the household.

A key informant interviewed in the Central Robusta region (with an implementing partner representative) described emerging changes in land allocation practices: **"***Husbands are now allocating land to the wives and children to grow coffee plots… women since they have been allocated land for coffee farming, they are eager to learn more on coffee production.***"**

Self-reported shifts in household decision-making are not mirrored in control over coffee revenues. Across qualitative and quantitative sources, revenue control remains concentrated with male household members even where women's labor contribution to coffee has increased. This is the clearest case in the data of participation outpacing agency.

Survey data reflect this dynamic: women's median household income is UGX 3,028,500, 55% of men's median of UGX 5,459,000 ($p < 0.001$) and only 4.5% of women exceed the Fair-Trade living income benchmark, compared to 10.5% of men. This gap persists despite comparable program exposure and access to GAP training. The disparity therefore does not reflect differences in what the program delivered to women and men. It reflects structural constraints on women's control over land, revenues and productive assets.

Increased youth participation through employment and engagement pathways

As with women, the pattern for youth shows stronger movement on participation and mindset than on ownership of productive assets. Youth are increasingly present in the value chain as service providers and laborers, but coffee farm ownership remains concentrated with older household members, which limits the pathway from engagement to independent income generation.

A youth participant in a Focus Group Discussion in Central Robusta highlighted changing perceptions of coffee farming among younger generations: **"***Youth involvement in coffee farming has increased because they are motivated by other young people who are becoming successful. Previously coffee farming was for the elderly men because they have land.***"**

In addition, youth respondents emphasized the importance of training in shifting mindsets and enabling income generation. As noted by a youth service provider during a Focus Group Discussion: **"***Mostly it has been trainings. Those lessons have changed mindsets which have transformed into good farming practices and led to increased income.***"**

These findings suggest the EALI program has made progress in repositioning coffee farming as a viable economic activity for younger generations, though youth participation often remains concentrated in supporting roles rather than coffee farm ownership. Among youth who were reached, quantitative data show no significant income gap compared to adult farmers, which is a positive signal in terms of youth inclusion. However, youth represent only 12% of endline respondents, suggesting the program has yet to engage younger farmers at scale.

ES3. To what extent did activities strengthen capacities for EU regulation compliance (EUDR/CSDDD)?

To answer this evaluation question, the analysis follows a structured contribution-based approach aligned with the program's Theory of Change, particularly the "convene and align" function. It identifies (i) the key outcomes related to strengthened capacities for EU regulatory compliance, (ii) the main interventions that contributed to these changes, (iii) the contextual factors shaping the extent of change, and (iv) the qualitative evidence supporting these findings.

The EALI program made a credible contribution to EUDR compliance capacity in both Kenya and Uganda, primarily through its convening and aligning role. The momentum behind EU regulation compliance was externally driven by the threat of EU market exclusion. EALI's contribution was in shaping how that compliance was structured and ensuring smallholder access to the resulting systems. Without EALI coordination, respondents suggest that the sector would have had a fragmented response: exporter-owned proprietary systems, limited public budget for smallholder sensitization, and no centralized data architecture. Instead, EALI's convening helped produce a centralized system that is publicly accessible and oriented toward smallholder inclusion. At the same time, progress on CSDDD remains nascent, and the aspiration to link EUDR compliance infrastructure to living income measurement has not yet been evidenced in practice.

What changed

Across both countries, the program contributed to moderate but uneven strengthening of EUDR compliance capacities. Awareness increased among exporters and institutional actors, but a persistent gap separates awareness from implementation, particularly at producer level. A government representative from a regulatory authority in Kenya explained how the risk of market exclusion is shaping behavior: *"Stakeholders are now aware that if they do not comply, they risk being locked out of the EU market. That realization has really pushed the conversation forward."*

In Kenya, progress is more visible in institutional awareness and private sector preparedness, while in Uganda, there is relatively stronger emphasis on collective action and sector-wide alignment, but with persistent structural gaps in implementation capacity. A representative from an industry association in Kampala highlighted that: "*The platform has helped bring everyone to the table to understand what EUDR means. Before, people were hearing about it, but now there is more structured discussion."* However, across both countries, stakeholders consistently flagged that smallholders remain largely uncaptured in compliance systems. A representative from a farmer federation in Uganda explained: "*Traceability is still a big challenge. At farmer level, many are not yet captured in any system, so compliance is still far."* Cost and feasibility concerns compound this gap, particularly in Uganda. A private sector actor working with coffee value chains stressed: *"The requirements are very high, and the cost of compliance is not small. For many actors, especially smallholders, it is not yet clear how this will be managed."*

Box 2. EUDR awareness among smallholder farmers: progress and remaining gaps

Based on key informant interviews, evidence suggests that awareness of EUDR compliance among smallholder farmers has increased, particularly in the case of **Uganda**, where more structured sensitization efforts linked to platform activities, government engagement, and compliance initiatives have been more prominently reported. In **Kenya**, while EUDR is recognized among sectoral actors, the available primary data provides more limited direct evidence on the extent of farmer-level awareness.

Across both countries, however, there is limited direct evidence of awareness and understanding by farmers themselves of EUDR requirements. While it is true that broad exposure to EUDR-related information appears to have occurred, any real depth of understanding or meaningful engagement by farmers remain less visible and we do not have evidence to clearly establish within this study.

The following quote by a private sector stakeholder in Uganda illustrates the breadth of engagement: *"We've seen more engagement, honestly, we've seen more engagement and engagement. We are looking at all tiers. So for example, we've seen the last mile farmer being involved, but also multiple level of stakeholders being involved. So we are looking at local government, private sectors, national government itself and also maybe partners, like funding partners and also other governments. So I think that has increased significantly."*

How the program contributed

The program acted as a facilitator of coordination and system design. Its contribution followed a specific causal logic: EALI-supported platforms convened competing actors around a shared EUDR response, brokered consensus on centralized infrastructure design, and created the conditions for public and donor investment in traceability systems accessible to smallholders.

In Uganda, the strongest evidence is the National Data Warehouse (DWH). When EUDR was announced, individual exporters moved to build proprietary farmer databases. The Uganda Coffee Platform convened these competing actors and brokered consensus around a shared system, with IDH providing international case studies (including Vietnam's model) and supporting the registry concept. The resulting architecture, one centralized warehouse with interoperable APIs and multiple approved applications, reflects design principles that may not have emerged from uncoordinated commercial responses alone. The DWH is now operational the national farmer registry, with approximately 1.68 million farms registered across aBi-funded (900,000) and Government of Uganda-funded (780,000) phases and about 1.2 million records uploaded by mid-2025, with the Government of Uganda and World Bank funding registration of remaining farmers.

In Kenya, IDH helped draft the national EUDR compliance roadmap through a dedicated working group, attracting EU technical funding. The KCP engaged the Coffee Executive Council to integrate county governments into planning. New KPCU and the Alliance of Bioversity International and CIAT shipped the first EUDR-compliant coffee consignment (320 bags, March 2026) from Kenya to Poland, using an approach that traced coffee to specific local washing stations. The Coffee Directorate subsequently coordinated a national geolocation mapping effort (with FAO, GIZ, UK FCDO, and Kenya Space Agency support), covering approximately 30% of the national coffee area by mid-2025. Even so, an actor directly involved in a coffee platform in Nairobi described the situation as ongoing system-building rather than full readiness: *"We are building the systems, but we are not yet there. It is more about preparing than actually complying at this stage."*

Table 14. Evidence assessment

Causal link	Status	Assessment
EALI convened sector actors around EUDR	Confirmed	Government, UCFA, and partner respondents independently attribute EUDR task force formation to platform convening. In Uganda, a government respondent stated: *"It was actually the coffee platform that rebirthed the EUDR task force.*" In Kenya, IDH joined the EU regulation working group and co-drafted the national EUDR roadmap.
Convening produced centralized infrastructure	Confirmed	When EUDR was announced, exporters moved to build proprietary databases. Platform convening brokered consensus on a shared DWH with interoperable APIs. A respondent confirmed the registry concept *"was not there before"* IDH's involvement. Actual mapping executed by PULA and funded by aBi Development, GoU, and World Bank.
Last-mile actors reached	Partial	Sub-national trainings delivered. EUDR one-pager developed. Master Trainer model adopted in public extension system. UCFA reported adoption of digital traceability would have been *"much slower"* without IDH. Scale and depth of adoption not verifiable from available data.
Compliance infrastructure captures LI data	Not yet evidenced	EUDR infrastructure tracks deforestation and geolocation only. Partners confirmed LI data is captured separately. No buyer cited using compliance data for LI purposes. Integration remains a future aspiration.
CSDDD preparedness advanced	Minimal	Multi-agency EUDR-CSLDD task force (with UCDA participation) formed in Uganda through platform advocacy. Interviews silent on CSDDD. No evidence of buyer engagement, capacity building, or operational change related to CSDDD compliance.

Alternative Explanations

With approximately 62% (UCDA, December 2025 of Uganda's coffee exported to the EU, EUDR created unavoidable commercial incentives that would have produced compliance investment regardless of EALI's involvement. In both countries, compliance is further shaped by structural constraints, including fragmented supply chains, limited digital infrastructure, high costs of traceability systems, and the predominance of smallholder production. (In December 2025, the EU postponed EUDR application to 30 December 2026 for large/medium operators and 30 June 2027 for micro/small operators, but the core due diligence architecture remains in force.)

The polygon mapping of 1.68 million farmers was executed by PULA and funded by aBi Development and the Government of Uganda; the World Bank funded remaining registration; and GIZ, TradeMark Africa, and Great Lakes Coffee also operated in this space. The question is not whether compliance would have happened without EALI, but what form it would have taken. The evidence suggests that without platform-brokered coordination, compliance would have been faster for large exporters and exclusionary for smallholders locked out of proprietary systems.

Assessment

EALI's convening approach helped shape how local actors responded to EU regulation compliance requirements, particularly by coordinating competing commercial actors around shared infrastructure. There is less evidence of last-mile adoption at scale, and the aspiration to embed living income considerations into compliance frameworks has not yet materialized, including through CSDDD, which unlike EUDR EUDR recognises the right to a living income within its broader human rights due diligence framework. (The EU Omnibus I package, adopted

February 2026, further narrowed CSDDD scope to firms with more than 5,000 employees and €1.5 billion turnover and deferred company compliance to July 2029, further limiting its near-term applicability to East African value chains).

5.3 Relevance

R1. How relevant has the Program been to the Kenyan and Ugandan coffee sectors, and what unique value or complementarity has it provided relative to other national or donor initiatives?

The EALI program is relevant to the needs of both the Kenyan and Ugandan coffee sectors. The program aligns with national policy instruments across both countries and complements other major actors, providing distinct contributions through living income measurement, cross-sector convening, commercialized service delivery, and gender-transformative interventions.

Table 14 summarizes how EALI's interventions align with the principal national policy instruments in Uganda and Kenya. Alignment is substantive: EALI contributed evidence, convening capacity, and technical content that shaped how national strategies have been operationalized.

Table 15. EALI alignment with national coffee sector policies and strategies

Policy / strategy	Country	EALI alignment
National Coffee Strategy 2023–2027	**Uganda**	Alignment with strategy priorities of export growth, farmer income, sustainable land management, and EUDR compliance
Coffee Roadmap (2017–2030)	**Uganda**	R&R of overgrown trees and productivity targets (6.5M to 20M bags); UCDA collaboration on seedlings, extension, and quality
National Coffee Sustainability Curriculum	**Uganda**	UCDA-led, platform-facilitated harmonization of extension training; Cafe Africa built R&R toolkit from this curriculum
Coffee Act 2021 and Regulations	**Uganda**	UCP advocacy shaped farmer protection provisions; EUDR/CS3D embedded within the regulations
Coffee Development and Marketing Strategy (2024)	**Kenya**	The KCP processing cost evidence formally incorporated; Robusta development and eco-pulping priorities
Coffee Directorate geolocation mandate	**Kenya**	IDH participated in EUDR working group; Directorate coordinated national mapping across 33 counties (~30% complete as of late 2025),, though direct attribution to IDH convening is unconfirmed
“Pesa mfukoni” framing	**Kenya**	KCP translated living income into locally legible concept; policymakers reportedly invoke farmer prosperity as a regulatory lens, though no policy has been modified as a result

Relevance to national policy is one dimension of the program's value. The second is complementarity with other donor and private sector investments in the sectors, where EALI filled gaps that other actors could not or chose not to address directly.

Table 16. Complementarity between EALI and other national and donor initiatives

Actor	Country	Their contribution	EALI's Role
World Bank	**Uganda**	Funded registration of farmers (third PULA contract under negotiation)	EUDR compliance created the mandate; UCP advocacy shaped the inclusive scope, ensuring universal farmer coverage rather than exporter-only traceability. MAAIF Commissioner credited the platform with *"rebirthing"* the EUDR task force.
TradeMark Africa	**Uganda**	Co-financed DWH governance and design study	IDH co-financed the study and provided international case studies (e.g., Vietnam traceability model) that shifted the sector toward a unified national registry approach.
BNP Paribas, Rabobank, IDH	**Uganda**	$25M Coffee Smallholder Livelihoods Facility (CSLF) under the NKG Bloom program	Separate EALI grant (€120K) to Ibero for M&E capacity, IVR/SMS technology for farmer outreach, and last-mile service delivery scaling layered on top of the existing credit infrastructure.
Nestlé Nespresso	**Uganda**	Quality premiums paid directly to farmers meeting sustainability standards	EALI aligned price driver interventions with Nespresso quality thresholds. Long-term commercial partnership pre-dating and outlasting EALI, not a project-based relationship.
GCP, JDE, Nestlé, Sucden, LDC, P4F	**Uganda**	Pooled co-investment for Youth for Coffee through GCP Collective Action Initiative	IDH co-funded; Cafe Africa managed implementation and established 150 Youth Coffee Service Provider business units. Pooled competitor investments into a shared R&R delivery model with open-source toolkit.
MAAIF public extension	**Uganda**	Government extension officers, policy oversight, and monitoring of partner activities	UCP trained public UCDA officers as Master Trainers, embedding sustainability and EUDR knowledge in the permanent public extension system rather than relying solely on private implementers.
Coffee Directorate	**Kenya**	Regulatory authority; budgeted national geolocation mapping for EUDR	IDH contributed to Kenya's national EUDR compliance roadmap, which aligned with existing EU MARKUP II (2023–2027) technical support. Direct attribution of IDH convening to the Directorate's budget decision is not confirmed in documents or KII testimony.

Two distinct contributions stand out in terms of EALI's unique value or complementarity. First, EALI acted as the convening platform that made other actors' investments coherent. The World Bank's farmer registration, TradeMark Africa's DWH study, the GCP youth initiative, and the BNP Paribas/Rabobank credit facility had separate mandates, and EALI's role was to align them around shared infrastructure and a common EUDR response. Second, the program brought living income into sector discourse as an operational concept rather than an aspirational one, through the Income Driver Calculator, the "pesa mfukoni" framing, and the KCP processing cost analysis.

R2. To what extent does the program strategy/ TOC explicitly address living income, and what design gaps exist in achieving this objective?

The ToC (discussed in I1) names the five income drivers to close living income gaps: yield, price, cost of production, land size, and income diversification. In theory, the program covers all five drivers. Operationally, the intervention portfolio concentrates on yield and cost of production, with more limited coverage of price, diversification, and land size. That asymmetry shows up in farmer-reported constraints, partner-level variation, and the living income attainment rate itself.

Overall, farmers rate EALI assistance as highly relevant: 59.2% very relevant and 36.7% somewhat relevant and 4.1% not at all relevant. The design gap is therefore not about whether the program fits farmers' immediate needs, but about whether fitting those needs is sufficient to close a living income gap.

Figure 18. Farmer-rated relevance of program assistance



The clearest evidence of the gap comes from comparing farmer-reported constraints against the assistance actually received. Low yield and high cost of production show strong alignment, with assistance rates within 3-4 percentage points of reported need. Two constraints show meaningful coverage gaps: price instability (44% reporting, 24% receiving market linkage support) and insufficient land (21% reporting, 3% using funding for land expansion). Diversification assistance exists but is not the focal point of the portfolio, which is consistent with reported income.

Figure 19. Program Interventions versus Farmer Needs



Partner-level variation is consistent with this design gap rather than with service quality differences. Smaller-scale, more diversified farmer populations report lower relevance scores of partner services because a productivity-focused intervention package fits larger, more coffee-dependent operations better. Larger farmers (>1 ha) rate the program very relevant at 62.9% versus 57.5% for smaller farmers. This is consistent with the logic that GAP improvements generate proportionally greater returns when applied across a larger planted area.

The gender finding points to a different kind of design gap. Women and men rate assistance almost identically (58.3% versus 59.8% very relevant). Qualitatively, we find evidence that the EALI program made real progress on women's participation in production, savings group membership, and voice in household decisions. At the same time, women's median household income remains 55% of men's. The binding constraints facing women, such as limited land control and income autonomy, operate outside the program's service delivery model.

The observed living income change is essentially a productivity story. Where there is room to increase yield significantly, productivity gains can move the needle on living income. Where it does not, there is a ceiling: only 7.3% of households meet the Fairtrade living income benchmark at endline despite overall yields more than doubling. Moving the remaining farmers across the threshold requires progress on dimensions the current portfolio operationalizes least: value redistribution through stronger buyer relationships and price transmission, and income stability through diversification and seasonal smoothing of non-coffee income streams.

Stakeholders consistently identified price volatility, pest and disease pressure, and input supply gaps as persistent sector constraints that fall beyond the program's direct reach. These are the same drivers surfaced in the farmer-reported constraint data. At the same time, demand for the continuation and scaling of existing support is strong, so the core offer is relevant and effective for what it targets. The key programmatic question for IDH is whether to deepen the core offer addressed under EALI or widen it to address the drivers currently outside the portfolio.

5.4 Efficiency

EC1. How efficiently were resources used and what is the potential for scaling?

A return on investment (ROI) framework is used to assess whether IDH's field-level program expenditure generated measurable economic impacts.

In terms of program cost, partners invested their own operating funds, both cash and in-kind, as well as leveraged funds from other donors (GIZ at Café Africa) and attracted commercial capital (Nespresso at Ibero) according to IDH's financial reports. In-kind contributions are valued at partner-reported cost (primarily staff time and operational overhead).

Across the three partners, the Act and Transform component of the EALI program cost €2,473,373 over 2023-2025. IDH contributed €482,705 of that, roughly one-fifth of the total project amount. This figure reflects partner-grant disbursements only; it excludes IDH's own technical oversight and administrative costs. The full EALI program reached 29,318 farmers, at a blended cost of about €84 per farmer, with IDH's share working out to approximately €16 per farmer.

The income side is based on the panel survey data from the study. Mean household income rose from 4.54M UGX at baseline to 10.60M UGX at endline, an increase of 6.07M UGX per household per year (+134%). The counterfactual analysis attributes 44% of that gain to the program after adjusting for UCDA national price trends (+70.1%) and traditional yield increases (+40.0%).

Therefore, the program-attributable gain is projected at 2.67M UGX (about €633) per farmer in Year 1, with a 5-year discounted present value of 7.4M UGX (about €1,758) per farmer. Aggregated across 29,318 farmers, this comes to approximately 217 billion UGX (about €51.5M). The ROI multiple works out to roughly 21x, considering the total program cost for all partners of €2.47M. For IDH's contribution alone of €482,705, the multiple rises to about 107x. That figure is better read as catalytic leverage than as a standalone efficiency claim:

For every €1 IDH committed, partners and other funders brought in an additional €4.12, generating approximately €107 in discounted farmer income over five years.

Table 17. Return on Investment, EALI Uganda

Metric	Whole program	IDH-only
Investment (EUR)	€2,473,373	€482,705
Cost per farmer (EUR)	€84	€16
5-yr PV of attributed benefits (UGX)	217.0B	217.0B
5-yr PV of attributed benefits (EUR)	€51.5M	€51.5M
ROI multiple	21x	107x

Table 18. ROI Model Assumptions

Parameter	Value	Rationale
Discount rate	8%	Reasonable estimate for Uganda context (6-12% range).
Annual drop-off rate	20%	Benefits decline 20% per year post-program. By Year 5, 41% of the Year-1 gain remains counted.
Outcome duration	5 years	Conservative; coffee trees stay productive for 20–30 years under normal conditions.
Attribution rate	44%	Counterfactual vs UCDA national price trend (+70.1%) and traditional yield change (+40.0%).

Sensitivity Analysis

If we adjust some of the assumptions: what share of the observed income gain is reasonably attributable to the program (44% base case), and how quickly benefits erode after program end (20% annual drop-off base case) we can come up with plausible ranges. Note, we keep the discount rate (8%) and horizon (5 years) fixed as conservative assumptions.

Table 19. EALI Program Attribution

	EALI Program Attribution		
Annual Drop-Off	33%	44% (base)	55%
15%	17x	23x	28x
20% (base)	16x	21x	26x
25%	14x	19x	24x

At the conservative end of the range (33% attribution, 25% annual decay), the whole-program multiple is 14x. At the optimistic end (55% attribution, 15% decay), it is 28x. If we consider IDH investment only, the sensitivity analysis produces multiples from 73x to 146x.

Potential for Scaling

EALI reached an estimated 29,318 farmers. UCDA estimates approximately 1.7 million coffee-farming households in Uganda, so the program reach was under 2% of the addressable sector.

Two findings support the case for scaling. First, income gains were consistent across all three partner contexts, including farmers who entered the program with limited prior relationships with their partners. The core components do not appear to depend on a specific partner's geography. Second, extension delivery costs per farmer typically decline as partner relationships and farmer organization mature, so the €84 full-cost figure is likely an upper bound rather than a floor.

Three constraints are likely prevent scaling. Only 7.3% of endline farmers achieved the Fairtrade living income benchmark, so scaling reach without increasing program intensity for the most constrained farmers will pull down average income uplift. Yield and quality gains depend on

continuing access to inputs, credit, and stable buyer relationships, all of which requires sustained investment beyond the grant period. Finally, the ability to find other partner firms that can sustain the 5.1:1 leverage and that have comparable operational capacity and geographic footprint is uncertain. The barriers for the next cohort of actors are likely greater than for this pilot group.

5.5 Sustainability

S1. To what extent are partners likely to sustain or expand outcomes?

The qualitative evidence indicates that the likelihood of sustaining and expanding outcomes is closely tied to the degree to which program-supported interventions have been integrated into partners' core business logic. Rather than uniform continuation of all activities under the EALI program, partners describe a process of selective retention, where those practices that demonstrate clear economic or operational value are more likely to persist beyond the program.

Across interviews, there is consistent evidence that interventions linked to productivity gains, improved quality, and strengthened market linkages are perceived as viable for continuation. In particular, where partners have observed improvements in supply reliability, product consistency, or farmer performance, there is a stronger rationale to maintain engagement. This is reinforced in cases where knowledge and technical practices have been effectively transferred to farmers and field-level actors, reducing the need for continuous external support.

At the farm level, the likelihood of sustainable adoption of practices is high. 99.6% of assisted farmers report being Likely or Very Likely to continue GAP practices once the program ends (n=936), with near-universal continuation intent across all three partners.

An implementing partner staff member highlighted this dynamic: **"***Farmers have already understood the practices and are applying them. Even if the project ends, they will continue because they are seeing the benefits in their yields.***"**

Table 20. Farm-level sustainability

Component	Who is likely to sustain it	Why it is likely to persist	Main risks and constraints	Outlook
Improved farming practices (productivity, GAP)	Farmers, with continued engagement from private sector partners	Practices are internalized by farmers and linked to visible yield improvements and income gains	Continued access to inputs; variability in returns; limited reach beyond trained farmers	Likely sustained; expansion plausible via partner-led extension to additional farmers
Knowledge and technical capacity (farmer-level)	Farmers, with partner extension support where it remains available	Knowledge transfer reduces reliance on continuous external support	Uneven diffusion beyond direct participants; risk of knowledge erosion over time; extension costs limit diffusion beyond trained farmers	Likely sustained at the individual level; expansion limited without continued extension investment

Component	Who is likely to sustain it	Why it is likely to persist	Main risks and constraints	Outlook
Shade tree and agroforestry practices	Farmers, conditional on pest management support	Supports soil health, canopy function, and long-term yield stability	Farmers actively removing shade trees due to perceived Black Coffee Twig Borer pressure; weak enforcement or incentives to maintain.	At risk; expansion implausible without sector-level pest management investment.
Adoption of sustainable inputs (organic fertilizer)	Farmers, supported by partners with subsidy structures or commercial reasons to absorb input costs	Improves soil health and reduces chemical dependency	Financial constraints limiting uptake; knowledge exists but affordability does not; risk of reversal once subsidies end	Partially sustained; expansion unlikely without cost-share arrangements or affordable supply channels
Use of improved coffee varieties	Farmers and nursery operators	Higher yields and disease resistance critical for long-term viability	Inconsistent certified planting material, low genetic purity, limited mother-garden coverage risk of yield stagnation	At risk; expansion contingent on seed-system progress.

Partner KII evidence points to selective retention rather than comprehensive replication of the program model. Some partners also signal intentions to expand elements of the model, particularly where these contribute to reducing operational risks or enhancing competitiveness.

A private sector actor interviewed through a KII reflected this perspective: *"We will continue working with these farmers because now we have a more reliable supply and better quality coffee […] it makes business sense for us."*

Evidence of continued expansion is indirect. If the supply-quality model continues to pay off at current scale, partners have a commercial rationale to extend it to additional farmers or new sourcing areas. Several constraints, however, impact the extent to which these outcomes can be sustained or scaled. A recurring theme across interviews is that certain functions (particularly those related to training, coordination, and last-mile engagement) have not yet been fully embedded within partner cost structures. Continuation depends on whether a commercial rationale, such as a reduced cost of low-quality rejects or retention of trained farmers against side-selling, becomes visible and whether partners can internalize the cost.

This challenge was also raised by an implementing partner representative: *"The training and follow-up require resources. Without the project support, it will be difficult to maintain the same level of engagement."*

In addition, not all promoted practices generate immediate or visible returns for partners, which reduces the incentive to maintain investment in areas where benefits are primarily realized at the farmer level. Capacity limitations also play a role, particularly in terms of human resources, operational reach, and the working capital of partner organizations. These factors affect not only the ability to sustain existing activities, but also the potential to expand them.

Table 21. Partner-level sustainability

Component	Who is likely to sustain it	Why it is likely to persist	Main risks and constraints	Outlook
Quality improvements and supply reliability	Private sector actors (buyers, exporters)	Improves product consistency, reduces sourcing risk, and strengthens commercial relationships	Price volatility; side-selling; weak or inconsistent quality incentives	Likely sustained; expansion plausible as partners extend the model to additional farmers or sourcing areas
Market linkages and sourcing relationships	Private sector actors with direct procurement interest	Strengthens supply chains, improves traceability, and directly reduces partner sourcing risk	High coordination costs; dependence on stable market conditions	Likely sustained; expansion plausible where procurement strategy rewards traceability
Training and farmer capacity-building	Farmers (as beneficiaries) via partner-led delivery where partners absorb the cost	Training underpins the supply base partners depend on; a visible commercial rationale.	High delivery costs; limited incentives to invest in farmer-level benefits; reliance on project funding	Partially sustained; expansion unlikely without cost absorption into partner budgets
Last-mile engagement (extension, follow-up, coordination)	Partner-employed extension staff during the project period	Drives adoption depth and reduces practice reversal after initial training	Human resource constraints; operational costs; weak integration into commercial models; “Without the project support, it will be difficult to maintain the same level of engagement” (KII)	At risk; expansion implausible without continued external funding or transfer to sector-level intermediaries
Farmer trust and program loyalty	Implementing private sector partners through continued farmer engagement	Critical for retention and long-term value chain integrity	Unfulfilled promises and payment disputes reported as damaging; farmers reporting dropout intent; risk of value chain erosion where trust weakens	Conditional on sustained engagement; depends on partners relationship quality.

Beyond the firm level, sustainability is further influenced by broader system conditions, including the functionality of input and output markets, access to finance, and the availability of supporting services. Where these elements remain underdeveloped, they constrain the extent to which partners can independently carry forward and scale program-induced changes.

Table 22. Sector-level sustainability

Component	Who is likely to sustain it	Why it is likely to persist	Main risks and constraints	Outlook
Service delivery models (e.g. youth service providers)	Local service entrepreneurs in areas with sufficient demand density	Potential to create local service markets where demand exists	Limited demand; affordability; uncertain business viability.	Partially sustained in high-demand sub-areas; expansion contingent on demand aggregation.
Broader system support (inputs, finance, services)	Market system actors (input suppliers, financial institutions, service providers)	Necessary to sustain and scale outcomes beyond direct partners	Underdeveloped markets; limited access to finance; gaps in service provision	Mixed; sustained and expanded only where similar actors close market gaps
Access to structured finance	Financial institutions and partner-linked credit facilities	Reduces dependency on informal debt and distress selling.	Farmers unaware of actual interest rates; informal debt cycles undermining investment capacity.	Conditional on partner-linked credit facilities continuing beyond the program; expansion limited by the sector baseline
Valuation of non-material support	Farmers and partners through sustained advisory engagement	Underpins long-term capacity without dependency on material inputs	Training and advisory support rarely recognized as valuable; risk of disengagement when material support ends.	Conditional; expansion implausible without concrete, visible returns from advisory engagement

Taken together, the evidence suggests that sustainability is most plausible where interventions are aligned with commercial incentives, supported by internal capabilities, and reinforced by a functioning market system. In such cases, partners are more likely to continue activities that directly contribute to supply reliability, product quality, and operational efficiency. However, where interventions rely on resource-intensive functions (such as training, coordination, and last-mile engagement) that have not yet been fully embedded within partner cost structures, continuation is more uncertain and often contingent on external support. As a result, outcomes are likely to persist through **selective continuation and adaptation**, rather than full replication of the program model. This highlights the importance of strengthening the business case for these functions and further embedding them within both partner business models and the broader market system to support longer-term persistence and scale.

Box 3. Premium coffee markets and structured buyers as drivers of system upgrading

Qualitative evidence indicates that engagement with **premium coffee markets** (particularly through structured buyers such as ***Nespresso*** and certified export channels) has contributed to upgrading practices among farmers integrated into more formalized value chains. While explicit references to such buyers are not widespread across all respondents, they provide important insight into how premium segments function in practice.

Where mentioned, these market linkages are associated with a combination of capacity building, improved post-harvest practices, and clearer quality requirements, enabling farmers to meet export-

grade standards and access more reliable market channels. As highlighted by a value chain actor in Central Uganda:

> *"Nespresso achieved a good coffee quality and provided market to farmers because of their capacity building, which wasn't the case before. Farmers were able to achieve the desired coffee standard in Europe, which wasn't before…"*

A local buyer in Central Uganda also referred to these premium market dynamics:

> *"On the farmer side, one major improvement is that farmers now have access to a more reliable and premium market. Through JKCC, farmers have also received practical training in good agronomic practices, which has strengthened how coffee is managed on the farm."*

This suggests that premium market access is not driven by price incentives alone, but by integrated support models combining technical assistance and guaranteed offtake. However, references to premium market engagement remain limited across respondents and are concentrated among a small subset of actors, particularly in Central Uganda. This likely reflects the stronger presence of structured, export-oriented value chains in this region, while such linkages appear less developed or less visible in Rwenzori area.

5.6 Coherence

C1. To what extent are IDH interventions coherent internally and externally (avoiding duplication, promoting synergy)?

The EALI program achieved strong internal coherence and meaningful external synergy through co-investment and sector-level coordination, though its reach beyond direct partners remains limited and certain structural risks to farmer income fall outside the program's operational scope.

Internal coherence

Design coherence within EALI

The three implementing partners operate in distinct geographies (Agri-Evolve in Western Rwenzori, IBERO across Central and Western regions, Cafe Africa in Central Robusta areas), each with distinct delivery models, which avoids duplication and produces comparative lessons from a shared pilot. Each partner bundled training, extension services, input access, and market linkages into an integrated package and most farmers experienced one or more aspects of partner support. For example, IBERO frames its service platform explicitly as a one-stop shop for credit, inputs, training, and digital payments while Agri-Evolve adopts a transparent pricing model.

In terms of producer organization, IBERO strengthens farmer groups for collective aggregation. Cafe Africa works through BUCADEF and existing cooperative structures. Agri-Evolve built twenty-seven Agri Hubs run by Agri Partners and Agri Agents as a functional equivalent where formal cooperatives were weaker. This reveals the capacity for context-responsive coherence and adaptability of the partners to achieve coherent goals through distinct means.

Execution, however, is where the internal coherence between partners was most vulnerable . A mixed group of smallholder farmers in Central Robusta noted: "*Sometimes [partner] takes long to pick our coffee and we get tempted to sell it to other buyers because of pressing needs.*" The model is coherent in its design but its realization depends on field-level reliability and coordination.

Institutional coherence with IDH

EALI operates from IDH's own Living Income framework. The Income Driver Calculator, Income Measurement Survey, Farmer Segmentation tools, and related curriculum are common across both EALI countries. The program is anchored in IDH's five-driver framework covering price, yields, land size, cost of production, and diversification of income sources, and in IDH's broader coffee strategy, which pairs living income with climate resilience as its dual commitment.

EALI's two-country program was asymmetric by design or limitation. Sector-level convening operated in both Kenya and Uganda through KCP and UCP, while implementing partner delivery operated only in Uganda. There is evidence of comparable outcomes achieved at the policy level with living income agenda and EUDR response. This evaluation cannot assess whether the policy and delivery layers produced additive effects, since farmer-level data exists only for Uganda.

External coherence

Co-investment with private sector

Partners co-invested operating funds leveraged donor co-financing and attracted commercial capital according to IDH's financial reports. IBERO combined IDH funds with co-financing from Nespresso. Cafe Africa integrated IDH funding with Partnerships for Forests (P4F) and co-investment from JDE, Nestle, Sucden, and LDC through the GCP Collective Action Initiative. IBERO's partnership with Nespresso introduced a quality premium of 7 cents per pound of green coffee paid to eligible farmers. Agri-Evolve's partnership with EMATA provided digital micro-loans to farmers. Cafe Africa embedded its youth coffee rehabilitation model within local partner organizations (BUCADEF, Mountain Harvest, LDC) and engaged MAAIF officials who actively monitored programming and contributed to the development of the youth training materials.

Sector-level platforms and government

Partnerships with the Uganda Coffee Platform (UCP) and Kenya Coffee Platform (KCP) helped to amplify the lessons learned from direct partnerships about Living Income and EUDR to the broader sector. UCP brokered consensus around a centralized National Data Warehouse and the MAAIF Commissioner credited UCP with *"rebirthing the EUDR task force."* UCP worked with UCDA to develop a harmonized national coffee sustainability curriculum. All three implementing partners collaborate closely with UCDA, which also sits on the Steering Committee for the "Youth for Coffee in Uganda" initiative, which is executed by Café Africa Uganda. Further, Cafe Africa's step-wise agronomy model is based on IITA research and uses an IITA mobile application.

These outcomes do not extend uniformly across the coffee sector. As an implementing partner representative in Central Robusta noted: "*The project targeted only 3,000 farmers, but we work with more than 20,000 farmers… that means the others will not know how good it is to live in a living income model.*" Change in sourcing and pricing is confirmed only among direct grant recipients. Furthermore, while platforms like UCP and KCP were tasked with institutionalizing this evidence to influence broader national policies and regulations, the gap between high-level convening and wide-scale adoption among non-participating private sector actors remains.

Coherence: Resilience capacities

IDH's coffee strategy pairs living income with climate resilience as a dual commitment. Evaluated against its own frameworks, EALI built three resilience capacities and delivered three others at much smaller scale or not at all. This is important to note as stakeholders reported project delivery

was frequently disrupted: Agri Evolve reported severe landslides destroying homes and crops, while Cafe Africa grappled with unpredictable weather and unexpected stem borer infestations.

Of the 77% of farmers who experienced at least one shock, only 28% fully recovered. Among the rest, 22% reduced spending, 20% borrowed and 15% sold assets. These coping patterns show farmers absorbing shocks individually rather than through structural buffers. EALI's implicit theory of resilience rested on raising productive output through GAP training, securing market access through partner buyer relationships, and extending financial inclusion through partner-linked credit. The evidence confirms that all three worked in part. But the low levels of resilience indicate that without strategies like diversification or risk transfer, many of the income gains are fragile.

Table 23. Resilience capacities EALI built

Capacity	IDH framework	EALI delivery	What the endline data shows
Productive capacity	Yields driver, IDH Living Income framework	Agronomic (GAP) training delivered through all three partners, reaching 663 of 882 shocked farmers (75%)	Among farmers hit by a shock in the past year, those who received agronomic training were more than twice as likely to fully recover their household situation (32% fully recovered) as those who did not (15% fully recovered). This is the largest resilience effect measured in the evaluation ($p<0.001$).
Market channel / buyer relationships	Price driver, IDH Living Income framework	Partner-linked buyer relationships: Nespresso quality premium through IBERO, EMATA-backed commercial sales at Agri-Evolve, LDC and Mountain Harvest through Cafe Africa	Farmers selling through partner-linked buyers were more likely to fully recover from shocks (31%) than farmers selling to non-partner buyers (24%). The number of buyers a farmer sold to make no difference; however, the quality of the primary relationship did.
Formal credit	Access to finance is an enabling condition of the IDH Living Income framework	Partner-linked credit channels (EMATA micro-loans at Agri-Evolve, IBERO's Farmer Services Unit, Agri-Evolve VSLAs) reached 272 of 882 farmers experiencing shocks	When shocks hit, EALI credit recipients were more likely to borrow (30% vs 15%) than farmers without EALI credit. Most EALI shock borrowing (78%) came from partner-linked lenders rather than distressed credit sources such as moneylenders, which helps to preserve future productive capacity.

Table 24. Resilience capacities EALI did not build at scale

Capacity	IDH framework	EALI delivery	What the endline data shows
Income diversification	Diversification of income sources, IDH Living Income framework	Diversification support reached 68 of 882 shocked farmers (8%)	Farmers with four or more income sources recovered from shocks at 41%, double the rate for farmers relying on a single source (19%). Low-income diversified farmers recovered more (35%) than high-income farmers who depended primarily on coffee (30%), which suggests that diversification is protective independent of wealth.
Risk transfer	Named under risk management in IDH's Living Income guidelines	Not operationalized; no crop insurance or collective risk-pooling mechanisms in EALI delivery	Drought and pest outbreaks are covariate shocks. Insurance or risk pools spread the loss across unaffected parties. Without them, farmers in shock zones fall back on coping strategies such as asset sales.

5.7 Strategic learning, actionable insights & recommendations

SL1. How have program stakeholders and external stakeholders reinforced or negatively impacted the intended changes (e.g. income increase, awareness and commitment to the living income concept) and emergent changes?

EALI outcomes were shaped as much by the context surrounding farmers as by the interventions that partners led on the ground. There is clear evidence of behavioral change at the farm level, including increased GAP adoption and on-farm investment. Whether that behavior translated into income depended on network-level conditions around the farmer. EALI successfully shifted buyer relationships, quality incentives, credit access, and reliable offtake for farmers. Beyond the network, macro-level factors including the policy environment, weather, and commodity prices played an outsized role, much of which was beyond the project's influence. And underneath all of this, fixed household conditions like land size, social norms, and limited diversification options capped how much any farming household could increase their income, regardless of what the project or what happened in the coffee market.

Where stakeholders reinforced intended change. Where network-level conditions held together, farm-level behavior converted into income. IBERO's partnership with Nespresso bundled technical support, a quality premium of 7¢/lb, and facilitated credit, which meant farmers had both the capacity and incentive to sustain improved practices. Agri-Evolve's hub model worked for the same reason: transparent prices, digital credit ahead of harvest, and a reliable buyer eliminated the cash-flow pressure that typically drives side-selling. Café Africa's Youth Business Unit model reached several times the scale, in terms of number of farmers, of other firms by embedding the service in the community rather than delivering it from outside. What these models had in common was that they worked on the conditions around the farmer. They addressed buyer relationships, pricing, and credit access within the coffee value chain, even if they made more limited progress on the constraints underneath (land size and diversification).

Where stakeholders undermined intended change. At the macro level, Kenya's vertical divestment reforms required integrated companies to choose a single value-chain stage. Most chose trading, which closed farm management divisions and ended extension programs. External policy and market conditions shaped what coffee firms were willing to offer in terms of services and value or risk-sharing with farmers. This had cascading effects on farmer behavior and income change. When a buyer was late to pick up, payment was delayed, or service was inconsistent, farmers sold to whoever showed up first. For the majority of coffee farmers, the incentive structures remain fractured. Roughly 68% do not receive a quality premium or reward and cost is the top barrier for 65 to 79% of farmers across every practice. Without a price signal that rewards quality, the logic that connects better practices to higher income is inconsistent.

Assumptions that hold the program logic together. The theory of change assumes that farmers have the capacity to respond to buyer-delivered services, that buyer relationships enable upgrading, and that quality improvements translate into better prices and higher, more living-income-like earnings. Each assumption depends on the previous one holding.

- **Assumption 1 - capacity to adopt.** Training reached 81% of participants and GAP adoption was 99.6%. Knowledge ranks as the lowest constraint across every practice, meaning that farmers adopted, regardless. But cost is a top barrier for 65 to 79% of farmers across every practices, 77% experienced severe climate shocks, and only 28% fully recovered. The capacity to adopt existed. The capacity to sustain adoption depends on cost, liquidity, and risk exposure, none of which the project controlled.
- **Assumption 2 - buyer relationships enable behavior change**. IBERO, Agri-Evolve, and Café Africa each delivered coordinated services including training, credit and offtake. But 38% of farmers rate buyer relationships as mixed. Payment delays and service inconsistency are the top drivers of dissatisfaction. Farmers reported that changes in market channels produced the least number of "better or improved" outcomes (42% reported improvement). Where buyers paid on time, picked up reliably, and rewarded quality, farmers changed behaviors. Where buyers treated the relationship as transactional, they didn't.
- **Assumption 3. quality translates to prices to income**. Only 38% of farmers received some form of a quality premium for their coffee sold. For the panel group, the reported farm-gate prices were flat, moving from UGX 9,028 to 9,041/kg, even as national prices rose 70%. Income gains came through production volume, not price capture. The quality-to-price logic works for farmers with enough land to produce premium-grade coffee at scale. It does not work for the smallholder majority. This is the critical break in the logic chain.

Table 25. Actionable insights and recommendations for future programming

Building on the strategic learning presented above, this table summarizes key actionable insights that the IDH team may consider for future programming. The MSA evaluation team has also assessed the potential feasibility and impact of each recommendation, as well as the strength of supporting evidence and whether recommendations relate to future programming or partner-level operational changes; however, we encourage the IDH team to further validate these assessments in line with their operational context.

Recommendations	Evidence and Implications	Type	Evidence Strength	Feasibility	Impact
1. Segment productivity strategies by farm size. For farms at or below one hectare, pair yield interventions with diversification and cost-efficiency strategies. For mid-sized farms, apply the current productivity package and expand rehabilitation support to capture premiums. For larger farms, shift toward larger investment-support and compliance alignment.	**Evidence:** Land size is the single strongest income predictor. Two-thirds of the sample farm one hectare or less, where coffee alone cannot close the living income gap. Diversification had nearly twice the impact on smallholders as on larger farmers. **Women:** Diversification support is critical for this group, along with addressing constraints to land, finance, and gender norms. **Youth:** Continued expansion into service roles and increasing access to assets (land and finance) to expand farming.	Programmatic [Future design]	Strong	High	High
2. Strengthen enforcement of transparent pricing, timely payments, and consistent offtake. Partners should prioritize structured advance payment arrangements as the cash-flow mechanism that makes predictable relationships possible and align incentives around quality or loyalty premiums.	**Evidence:** Trust and transparency produce better outcomes for both buyer and farmer. Premiums are a demonstrated tool for quality and compliance (non-side-selling). That farmers still use middleman channels indicates middlemen function as liquidity providers the formal channel does not yet replace. **Women:** Household norms still mediate women's ability to sell. Social normative programs to influence intrahousehold dynamics are necessary to reach women producers. **Youth:** Since youth enter markets through service provision primarily, engagement through supply chains as last-mile service providers provides an avenue for youth inclusion.	Operational [Partner-level changes]	Strong	Medium	High
3. Strengthen last-mile input delivery models. Support partners to improve input availability, affordability, and timeliness through bundled delivery, local stock points, and agent models. Replicate delivery approaches from partners demonstrating strong reach.	**Evidence:** 68% of farmers cite cost as the primary GAP adoption barrier (the highest constraint). Input reach varies across models, revealing significant gaps. Despite the increase in labor costs, few farmers had used professional services. This is despite proven models existing with the program. **Women:** Women face an additional labor/time barrier, shifting priority toward labor-saving services alongside input access. **Youth:** Expanding delivery through YCSP networks is both a delivery solution and a youth livelihood pathway.	Operational [Partner-level changes]	Moderate	Medium	High

Recommendations	Evidence and Implications	Type	Evidence Strength	Feasibility	Impact
4. Expand productive investment and match loan products to investment cycles. Expand loan size for working capital and develop longer-term renovation credit, tying use to supply chain to reduce diversion and ensure productive investment. Build directly on the financial models that are linked to income improvements under EALI.	**Evidence:** Funds directed to coffee inputs or renovation produce better outcomes, and cooperative and buyer-linked credit outperform other channels. The absence of renovation credit is a limitation for renovation and stumping practices. EALI-tested models that warrant scale-up include EMATA's digital pre-financing with Agri Evolve and Ibero Uganda's revolving credit facility under NKG Bloom for working capital, equipment, and farm expansion loans. **Women:** Women take smaller loans, and more often for household purposes. Consider special-purpose financial products that allow women to manage cash flow. **Youth**: For youth who lack collateral and credit histories, digital micro-loans and asset-linked leasing are more viable.	Programmatic [Future design] + Operational [Partner-level changes]	Moderate	Medium	High
5. Strengthen alignment with non-program market actors. Engage additional buyers, government extension, and agro-dealer networks to reduce dependence on program-linked channels and build more resilient market systems.	**Evidence:** Cooperative staff, buyer agents and technicians deliver most technical assistance, which creates dependency. Government extension and agro-dealers can support broader GAP adoption, despite their more limited reach. **Women:** Women access less extension through formal, cooperative channels, reinforcing the need for alternatives. **Youth:** Engaging buyers willing to contract YCSPs for last-mile services expands youth service demand.	Programmatic [Future design]	Moderate	Medium	High
6. Approach women's active economic participation as a commercial strategy, not only an equity obligation. Integrate joint decision-making, women's control over income and assets, and engagement of male household decision-makers into the core economic intervention.	**Evidence:** Women on farms above one hectare showed the highest income growth, indicating their commercial potential, yet women are half as likely to reach the living income benchmark as men, despite comparable program exposure. Standalone gender training had the lowest outreach, indicating little had been done at scale to address gender norms. **Women:** Design must address labor/time barriers, smaller loan size, and revenue control within the household. **Youth:** Young women face compounding age and gender constraints. Monitor as a distinct segment.	Programmatic [Future design]	Moderate	Medium	High

Recommendations	Evidence and Implications	Type	Evidence Strength	Feasibility	Impact
7. Integrate Living Income metrics into compliance and traceability systems, Leverage existing partner digital infrastructure to embed income, cost, and value-distribution tracking alongside compliance data.	**Evidence:** Partner digital systems already capture farm-level data at scale. EUDR and CSDDD compliance systems are advancing but not yet aligned with Living Income objectives. **Women:** Include gender-based data and the share of Living-Income-aligned payments reaching women producers directly. **Youth:** Track youth farms and youth service provider income separately against Living Income thresholds.	Programmatic [Future design]	Moderate	Medium	High
8. Embed Living Income into pricing, sourcing, and partner performance systems. Support partners to apply Living Income benchmarks in procurement decisions, supplier requirements, and performance tracking so benchmarks shape day-to-day commercial practice.	**Evidence:** Awareness has risen but has not translated into procurement or pricing practice. The operationalization of Living Income in procurement decisions (e.g., what to price, what services to deliver) has reached limited scale. **Women:** Set targets for women's participation, and tied women's income to Living-Income-aligned incentives. **Youth:** Contract YCSPs for first-mile aggregation and traceability, expanding youth revenue streams.	Programmatic [Future design] + Operational [Partner-level changes]	Low-Moderate	Low-Medium	High

6. Conclusions

The program experienced significant tailwinds for Ugandan coffee farmers. National robusta prices rose roughly 70% and national yields climbed approximately 40%. Against that backdrop, household incomes more than doubled (+134%), and the counterfactual analysis estimates that about 44% of the gain is associated with program effects, above what market trends alone would have produced. Despite these significant returns, the median household still earns roughly one-quarter of what a decent standard of living requires. The conclusions below synthesize what this evidence means for the program's core questions.

1. Income improvements are real but structurally constrained

The program contributed to material income gains for coffee farmers. Panel households saw total income rise from UGX 4.5 million to UGX 10.6 million. These are meaningful shifts. But the median household would still need to triple its income to reach the Anker benchmark and quintuple it to reach Fairtrade. The main reason for this is land. Farm size alone explains 61% of income variation across the endline population, and two-thirds of the sample farm one hectare or less. In other words, the program moved farmers up the income ladder, but it could do only so much given the starting rung. The challenge is that farm size sets the ceiling on how far productivity-focused interventions alone can push household income, for the smallholder majority, and it is the structural constraint the next phase needs to address directly.

2. Productivity-focused interventions worked at the farm level.

Where EALI applied its productivity package, yields increased. Near-universal GAP adoption and yields that more than doubled over the program period are unambiguous findings. A handful of practices, tree rejuvenation, improved seedlings, and pest and disease management, carried the most influence on the measured yield gain. Input costs, not knowledge, are the main barrier to technology and practice adoption. Two-thirds of farmers cited expense as the top constraint, while only 12% cited lack of knowledge. Climate shocks compound the problem. 77% of farmers experienced severe shocks during the project period, and only 28% fully recovered. Agronomic gains are necessary but fragile without complementary support in input access, finance, and climate resilience. Yield is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition towards a living income.

3. Integrated support produces compounding returns

The farmers who had the largest income gains, received combined interventions. Diversification support, GAP training, credit and finance, and input support produced positive effects across every farmer segment tested, and the effects compounded when delivered together. The logic is straightforward. Better practices lead to better yields. Better yields lead to higher incomes. Higher incomes fund reinvestment. When these conditions hold, the causal logic reinforces itself. Where any single link breaks, inputs are unavailable, credit gets diverted to consumption, or market access becomes unreliable, farmers revert to coping strategies and income falls again. The program's strongest results came from partners who built the full chain into their delivery model.

4. Structural barriers limit impact for women

Women's median household income at endline was 55% of men's, and less than half as many women as men cleared the Fairtrade Living Income benchmark. This is not an access problem. Women participated in GAP training at comparable rates to men and reported comparable levels of voice in farm decisions. The gap is in who controls coffee revenues once they arrive. Household decision-making over coffee income remains concentrated with male household members, and women face additional time and labor constraints that compress their ability to act on the training they receive. Participation alone does not close this gap. Closing the gap requires complementary interventions targeted at the strongest leverage areas (diversification, GAP, input support, and credit), where women currently realize smaller gains than men. It also requires household-level interventions to make farm revenue more visible and negotiable within the family, through structured dialogue methodologies and time and labor easing measures that reduce women's unpaid work burden. Sustained progress will also depend on more deliberate engagement with the social norms and power dynamics that shape revenue control at the community level

5. System-level change remains nascent

The program's clearest system-level contribution is with its direct partners and through EUDR coordination. Agri-Evolve, Cafe Africa, and IBERO have embedded Living Income into their farmer engagement and sourcing models, and compliance infrastructure is advancing across both countries. For the sector beyond the three grant recipients, the picture is thinner. Living Income has become a reference point in sector discourse, but no non-partner firm has changed its sourcing contract or pricing model because of the platform engagement. The broader pattern is that behavioral change follows market and regulatory incentives. Where actors do not perceive a direct commercial or regulatory driver, movement beyond awareness remains limited. This is not a failure of the convening approach. It is a signal that awareness-stage activities have reached their ceiling, and the next phase requires different levers: operational tools, incentive structures, or regulatory anchors that make Living Income a business decision rather than a concept.

ANNEXES

Annex 1: Data collection tools and analytical coverage

This annex summarizes the range of data collection tools used in the evaluation and the key dimensions each tool was designed to capture. Together, these tools provide complementary evidence across farmer-level outcomes, system dynamics, and program performance, enabling a robust triangulation of findings.



Annex 2: Sample details

This annex provides an overview of the sample composition for both quantitative and qualitative data collection, including the distribution of respondents by country, actor type, and key demographic characteristics. It aims to support transparency in the analysis and to help contextualize and interpret the findings presented in the report.

QUANTITATIVE SAMPLE DETAILS

Partner	Baseline (N)	Endline (N)	Panel (N)
Agri-Evolve	288	392	101
Cafe Africa	471	358	221
IBERO	199	397	81
TOTAL	958	1147	403



Adult Women, Men & Youth Comparison

- The number of adult males and females increased from baseline to endline.
- There was a slight increase in youth participants from baseline to endline.
- Panel sample sizes show repeat participation across survey rounds.

QUALITATIVE SAMPLE DETAILS – *ACT & TRANSFORM (UGANDA)*

GENERAL

Focus Group Discussion: 13
Key Informant Interview: 22

Female= 10 (29%)
Male = 17 (49%)
Mixed = 8 (23%)

Adult = 29 (83%)
Youth = 5 (14%)
Mixed = 1 (3%)

CENTRAL ROBUSTA AREA	RWENZORI AREA
Focus Group Discussion: 6 Key Informant Interview: 11	Focus Group Discussion: 7 Key Informant Interview: 11

















Type of Actor (N)	Central	Rwenzori	Total
FGD Lead farmers or Farmer groups or coop	1	1	2
FGD Mixed smallholder coffee farmers	1	2	3
FGD VSLA or Saving group members	1	1	2
FGD Women smallholder coffee farmers	1	1	2
FGD Youth service providers/field contractors	1	1	2
FGD Youth smallholder coffee farmers	1	1	2
FGDs subtotal	6	7	13
KII Cooperative or farmer group leader	2	2	4
KII District agricultural officer or extension	1	1	2
KII FSP or SACCOS	1	1	2
KII Input dealers or nurseries	1	1	2
KII IP agronomists or field officers	2	2	4
KII IP field manager or M&E lead	2	2	4
KII Local buyer or exporters or wet mills	2	2	4
KIIs subtotal	11	11	22

QUALITATIVE SAMPLE DETAILS – *CONVENE & ALIGN (UGANDA & KENYA)*

KENYA	(N)
Industry Association	1
Ministry of Trade	1
Coffee Platform	1
Sector Regulator	1
Private sector	1

UGANDA	(N)
Ministry	1
Private Sector	2
Industry Association	2
Coffe Platform	1
Farmers Federation	2

Annex 3: Living Income Calculation Methodology

1. Overview

This annex describes the methodology used to calculate the Living Income indicators presented in this evaluation. The approach follows the IDH Income Measurement Guidance framework, computing total annual household income from all sources and comparing it against region- and coffee-type-specific Living Income benchmarks. Two benchmarking methods are applied: a flat (household-level) comparison and an equivalence-adjusted comparison using the Modified OECD scale. Both the Anker/SHIFT benchmarks (primary, preferred by IDH) and the Fairtrade Living Income Reference Price (for comparison with the baseline assessment) are reported. The same methodology is applied to both endline and baseline data, with benchmark values and CPI adjustments specific to each data collection period.

2. Total Household Income: Calculation Structure

Total household income is constructed as the sum of net coffee income and diversified (non-coffee) income, minus the annual cost of borrowing. Each component is built from survey-reported fields that were independently verified and recomputed during data quality assurance.

Total Household Income = A + B − C

A. Net Coffee Income (= A1 − A2)

- **A1. Annual Coffee Revenue:** Sum of quantity sold (kg) multiplied by price per kg, computed separately for each harvest season and summed across both seasons.

- **A2. Total Coffee Production Costs**, comprising:
  - Labour costs: land preparation, maintenance, input application, harvesting, post-harvest processing, and labour benefits
  - Input costs: seedlings, organic fertilizer, inorganic fertilizer, chemicals, and other inputs
  - Equipment costs
  - Service costs
  - Land rent costs

B. Diversified (Non-Coffee) Income (= B1 + B2 + B3 + B4)

- **B1. Other crop net income**: Revenue minus input, labour, and transport costs, computed for up to four ranked crops and summed.
- **B2. Livestock net income**: Total livestock revenue (goats, cattle, pigs, sheep, rabbits, chicken, ducks, and other species) minus total livestock costs (hired labour, fodder, and veterinary expenses).
- **B3. Business income**: Net income from up to three non-farm business activities.
- **B4. Other non-farm income**: Wages, land rental income, equipment rental income, processing income, seed sales, government transfers, remittances, gifts, and other sources. Credit and loan proceeds are excluded from income, consistent with IDH methodology.

C. Annual Loan Cost (deducted)
The annual cost of borrowing is computed based on the reported loan interest type:

- Percentage per month: (rate ÷ 100) × loan amount × 12
- Percentage per year: (rate ÷ 100) × loan amount
- Fixed fee: fee annualized by loan term
- No interest: zero

Only the cost of borrowing (interest or fees) is deducted, not the loan principal repayment.

3. Living Income Benchmarks

Three benchmark sources are used in this evaluation, assigned based on coffee type:

Table A: Living Income Benchmark Values

Benchmark source	Coffee type	Nominal value (UGX/year)	Reference date	Reference household
Anker/ALIGN Lake Victoria Basin, 2025 estimate	Robusta	14,984,556	September 2025	5 members (2 adults, 3 children)
SHIFT Rwenzori Coffee	Arabica	20,718,267	September 2019	7.76 members (3.6 adults, 4.1 children)
Fairtrade LIRP (comparison)	Robusta	21,385,221	October 2022	~7 members (~4 adults, ~3 children)
Fairtrade LIRP (comparison)	Arabica	22,404,093	October 2022	~7 members (~4 adults, ~3 children)

The Anker (Robusta) and SHIFT (Arabica) benchmarks serve as the primary reference values for this evaluation, consistent with IDH's preference for Anker-methodology benchmarks. The Fairtrade LIRP values are included for comparison with the baseline assessment, which reported against Fairtrade benchmarks.

Benchmark assignment by coffee type. Farmers growing only Robusta varieties are assigned the Anker benchmark. All other farmers — including those growing Arabica, both varieties, or with unspecified type — are assigned the SHIFT Arabica benchmark. This conservative assignment ensures that farmers with any Arabica production are measured against the higher benchmark.

Baseline benchmark. For baseline comparisons, the Anker 2023 study value (13,878,528 UGX, dated June 2023) is used rather than the 2025 estimate, as the latter was not published at the time of baseline data collection (March 2024).

4. CPI Adjustment

Table B: CPI Values Used for Benchmark Adjustment

All benchmark values are adjusted to the respective data collection period using the Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS) Consumer Price Index (base period: 2016/17 financial year = 100, all items, national).

Period	CPI value	Application
September 2019	108.46	SHIFT benchmark reference date
October 2022	126.13	Fairtrade LIRP reference date
June 2023	126.79	Anker 2023 study (baseline benchmark)
March 2024	131.03	Baseline data collection period
September 2025	137.61	Anker 2025 estimate (endline benchmark)
February 2026	139.06	Endline data collection period

The adjustment formula is:

Benchmark (adjusted) = Benchmark (nominal) × (CPI at data collection ÷ CPI at benchmark date)

Table C: CPI-Adjusted Benchmark Values (Endline)

Benchmark	CPI-adjusted value (UGX/year)
Anker Robusta	15,143,402
SHIFT Arabica	26,563,946
Fairtrade Robusta	23,567,019
Fairtrade Arabica	24,690,513

5. Benchmarking Methods

Two methods are applied to compare each household's income against the applicable benchmark:

Method 1: Flat (household-level) comparison

Under this method, the benchmark value is applied directly to the household without adjustment for household size or composition. This approach matches the methodology used in the baseline assessment, enabling direct comparison over time.

Living Income Gap = Benchmark (adjusted) − Total Household Income

Percentage of Living Income Achieved = (Total Household Income ÷ Benchmark) × 100

At or Above Living Income = Yes, if Total Household Income ≥ Benchmark

Method 2: Equivalence-adjusted comparison (Modified OECD scale)

Under this method, the benchmark is rescaled to each household's size and composition using the Modified OECD equivalence scale, which assigns the following weights:

- 1.0 for the first adult household member
- 0.5 for each additional adult member
- 0.3 for each child under 18

The household's adult-equivalent count is then used to adjust the benchmark:

Adjusted Benchmark = (Nominal Benchmark ÷ Reference Adult Equivalents) × Household Adult Equivalents × CPI Adjustment

where Reference Adult Equivalents is the equivalence count of the benchmark study's reference household (2.4 for Anker, 3.53 for SHIFT, 3.4 for Fairtrade).

This method accounts for variation in household size and composition across the sample. Larger households face a higher adjusted benchmark, reflecting the higher income required to achieve the same standard of living.

6. Sources

- Anker, R. & Anker, M. (2025). "Living Wage for Lake Victoria Basin, Uganda" — 2025 estimate. Global Living Wage Coalition / ALIGN.
- Anker, R. & Anker, M. (2023). "Update Report: Living Wage/Income for Rural Uganda, Lake Victoria Basin." Global Living Wage Coalition.
- GLC & SHIFT (2019). "Sustainable Living Incomes for Ugandan Coffee Farmers in the Rwenzori Region." September 2019.
- Fairtrade International (2022). "Living Income Reference Price for Coffee from Uganda." October 2022.
- Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS). Consumer Price Index tables, February 2026 release.
- IDH (n.d.). Income Measurement Guidance Tool.
- OECD (n.d.). Modified OECD Equivalence Scale.

Annex 4: Limitations and Mitigation Strategies Adopted

Overview

This annex documents the key methodological and data limitations of the endline evaluation, and the strategies applied to mitigate their effects on the validity and reliability of findings. These limitations are inherent to the evaluation design, data collection context, and analytical approach, and are presented here to support transparent interpretation of results.

1. Quantitative Limitations

1.1. Data quality measures applied before analysis

Several data quality steps were applied prior to income aggregation to ensure the reliability of the calculated indicators:

Sentinel value treatment. Survey responses coded as “Don’t Know” (9999) or “Prefer Not to Say” (9998) were recoded as missing across all numeric fields before any sums or aggregations were computed. Additional sentinel codes identified during data quality review (e.g., 99999 in quantity-sold fields) were treated similarly.

Price imputation. For observations where farmers reported quantity sold but had missing or zero price data, prices were imputed using a hierarchical median approach: first by coffee processing step, then by implementing partner, then by the overall sample median. Revenue was recomputed for these observations and flagged accordingly.

1.2. Partial panel design

Limitation. Of the 1,157 clean endline respondents in the analysis sample, only 403 (~35 percent) could be matched to baseline observations. The remaining endline respondents were either newly sampled or could not be linked to a baseline record due to attrition, identifier discrepancies, or replacement sampling. As a result, baseline-endline comparisons are based on a subsample rather than the full population of program beneficiaries.

Mitigation. The evaluation combines panel analysis (for the 403 matched observations) with cross-sectional analysis of the full endline sample. Differences in the composition of panel and non-panel respondents are documented, and key findings are reported for both groups.

1.3. Baseline data quality

Limitation. Differences in survey instrument design and data processing between the baseline and endline rounds introduced variability in how certain variables were recorded. These included differences in sentinel value treatment, data type encoding for household composition variables, and variable naming conventions. While these differences were harmonized during endline cleaning, they reduce confidence in the precision of some baseline-endline delta calculations.

Mitigation. All baseline variables used in panel analysis were subjected to the same data quality procedures applied to the endline data. A detailed variable mapping exercise documented coding and response differences between baseline and endline instruments, classified by severity. Variables with fundamental structural changes between survey rounds are flagged and excluded from delta computation.

1.4. Absence of a control group

Limitation. The evaluation follows a pre-post design without a counterfactual comparison group. Observed changes between baseline and endline cannot be attributed solely to the program, as external factors — including coffee price movements, climatic conditions, macroeconomic dynamics, and other development interventions — may also have influenced farmer outcomes.

Mitigation. The evaluation employs contribution analysis to assess the plausibility of causal linkages between program activities and observed outcomes. Quasi-experimental comparisons across farmers with different levels and types of program exposure are used to assess dose-response patterns. Qualitative evidence is triangulated with quantitative findings to strengthen causal inference.

1.5. Self-Reported income data

Limitation. All income data are self-reported by farmers through a structured survey instrument. Self-reported income is subject to recall bias, social desirability effects, and estimation error, particularly for non-coffee income sources where record-keeping is generally limited.

Mitigation. The survey instrument disaggregated income into detailed components to support structured recall and reduce aggregation error. Enumerator training emphasized probing and verification techniques. All income totals were independently recomputed from component fields, and outlier flags were generated for key income variables.

1.6. Living income benchmark comparability

Limitation. The Living Income benchmarks used in this evaluation originate from different studies, apply to different coffee types, reference different household compositions, and were calculated at different points in time. These differences mean that the absolute proportion of households achieving Living Income is sensitive to the choice of benchmark.

Mitigation. All benchmarks are adjusted to the data collection period using the UBOS Consumer Price Index. Two benchmarking methods are applied: flat and equivalence-adjusted. Both the Anker/SHIFT and Fairtrade LIRP benchmarks are reported, enabling readers to assess sensitivity to benchmark choice.

1.7. Outlier sensitivity

Limitation. The sample includes observations with extreme income values. Ten observations report income per capita exceeding 50 million UGX, likely reflecting atypical reporting patterns in seasonal revenue figures. These extreme values can influence means and summary statistics, particularly for subgroup analyses.

Mitigation. Outlier detection was applied to over 80 variables using a 2x IQR rule. All flagged values are retained with accompanying binary flags. Analysis reports key indicators with and without outlier exclusion where the influence of extreme values is material.

1.8. Seasonality and timing of data collection

Limitation. Endline data were collected in February 2026, capturing a single point in time within the agricultural calendar. Coffee income is inherently seasonal and volatile. Reported income levels may not be representative of annual averages.

Mitigation. The survey instrument collected income data separately for each of the two harvest seasons. Season alignment between baseline and endline instruments was verified during the variable mapping exercise.

1.9 Statistical power for subgroup analysis

Limitation. Disaggregated analyses by gender, youth status, implementing partner, and other variables reduce the effective sample size within each cell. For some subgroups, cell sizes may be insufficient to detect statistically significant differences.

Mitigation. Subgroup analyses are reported with sample sizes and confidence intervals. Where cell sizes fall below thresholds for reliable inference, findings are presented as indicative. Qualitative evidence is used to complement quantitative subgroup findings.

2. Qualitative Limitations

2.1. Limited availability and partial project engagement

Limitation: Some planned respondents were unavailable or unable to fully respond due to limited involvement in the project. This affected response completeness, particularly on IDH-related and living income questions.

Mitigation: Replacements were identified through snowball sampling, drawing on recommendations from implementing partners and relevant organizations. Where replacements also had partial engagement, responses were cross-checked against those from implementing partners who had deeper project involvement.

2.2. Response gaps

Limitation: Several respondents did not answer certain questions, attributable to the scope of their project involvement, their area of expertise, or the nature of their observations.

Mitigation: Where individual responses were incomplete, triangulation across multiple respondents at this level, across other stakeholder groups an with secondary literature was used to fill gaps.

2.3. Limited respondent pool

Limitation: The overall pool of available and reachable respondents at this level was constrained, especially identifying respondents affiliated with UCP as well as program implementation.

Mitigation: Sampling difficulties were partially addressed through snowballing to identify additional respondents beyond the initial list, though with limited returns. Despite this, the final number of completed interviews for this group fell below the original target quota.

3. Summary

Table D: Summary of Limitations and Mitigation Strategies

#	Limitation	Mitigation strategy
1	Partial panel design (35% match rate)	Combined panel and cross-sectional analysis; composition differences documented
2	Baseline instrument differences	Baseline variables harmonized with endline procedures; variable mapping exercise; restructured variables flagged
3	No control group	Contribution analysis; quasi-experimental comparisons by exposure level; qualitative triangulation
4	Self-reported income data	Disaggregated recall; enumerator training; independent recomputation; price imputation; outlier flagging
5	LI benchmark differences across coffee types	CPI adjustment; dual benchmarking methods; multiple benchmark sets reported
6	Outlier sensitivity	IQR-based flagging; results reported with and without extreme values
7	Seasonality and single-point data collection	Seasonal disaggregation; season alignment verified across survey rounds
8	Limited statistical power for subgroups	Sample sizes reported; findings qualified where cell sizes are small; qualitative complementarity
9	Planned qual respondents unavailable or partially engaged	Replacements via snowballing; cross-checked against implementing partner responses
10	Incomplete responses due to limited project involvement or expertise of key informants	Triangulation across respondents and stakeholder groups; implementing partner responses weighted more heavily
11	Limited pool of key informants concentrated among implementing partners and UCP staff	Snowball sampling; settled for lower quota than targeted for this group

Annex 5: List of Documents Reviewed

1. Baseline & Endline Evaluation Documents

- BASELINE_EALI_Report_Final.pdf
- BASELINE_EALI_InceptionReport_2023-11.docx
- BASELINE_EALI_IP_SessionPres_2024-08.pptx
- ENDLINE_EALI_TOR.pdf
- ENDLINE_EALI_LoA_MSA_Draft4.pdf
- ENDLINE_EALI_KPI_Annex.pdf
- ENDLINE_EALI_KickoffPres_2025-11.pdf
- PROGDEV_EALI_MEPlan_v1.docx

2. Program Design & Partner Proposals

- PROPOSAL_EALI_Concept_2022-04.pptx
- PROPOSAL_AGRIEVOLVE.pdf
- PROPOSAL_CAFEAFRICA_Y4C.pdf
- PROPOSAL_IBERO.pdf
- PROPOSAL_60dB_AgriEvolve_ImpactMeasurement.pdf

3. Sector Studies, Guidance, & Roadmaps

- STUDY_EALI_DataWarehouse_2025-10.pdf (Design Study on Options for the Governance, Management and Financial Design of a EUDR Common Data Warehouse for Uganda)
- STUDY_GCP_FOB_Farmgate_SupplyChain_2022.docx
- CONVENING_LIVINGINCOME_Roadmap_2025.pptx
- GUIDANCE_IncomeMeasurementUserGuide.pdf

4. Partner Field-Level Progress & KPI Reports

- RPT_AGRIEVOLVE_2024_Annual_KPI_Narrative.pdf
- RPT_AGRIEVOLVE_2025-Q1_KPI_Narrative.pdf
- RPT_AGRIEVOLVE_2025-Q2_KPI_Narrative.pdf
- RPT_CAFEAFRICA_2025-Q1_KPI_Narrative.pdf
- RPT_IBERO_2024-Q1_KPI_Narrative.pdf
- RPT_IBERO_2024-Q2_KPI_Narrative.pdf
- RPT_IBERO_2024-Q3_KPI_Narrative.pdf
- RPT_IBERO_2024-Q4_KPI_Narrative.pdf

5. Global Coffee Platform (GCP) / National Platform Progress Reports

- RPT_GCP_2022-H1_Narrative.pdf
- RPT_GCP_2023-H1_Narrative.pdf
- RPT_GCP_2023-H2_Narrative.pdf
- RPT_GCP_2025-H1_Narrative_WithComments.pdf
- RPT_GCP_2025-H2_Narrative.docx

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